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INTRODUCTION  
 
Cyberspace is a domain, which with the expansion of technological development and 
information has caused society to be greatly dependent on it.1 While people are getting online 
and society’s reliance on computer networks grows, the vulnerability to attacks against States 
and civilians infrastructures increases,2 accentuating the need of an adequate legal framework 
for cyberspace. Cyberspace is widely used to conduct of malicious cyber operations3 due to the 
low cost of entry, abundance of legal challenges such as ambiguity of rights and responsibilities, 
and lack of attribution, which makes cyberspace an attractive area for all malicious State and 
non-State actors. Such actors often disguise their identity, seek to access information, 
undermine or damage systems, and attempt to gain a financial, political, or strategic advantage.4  
 
Several established legal scholars have published articles on how States can respond to 
malicious cyber operations based on the law of self-defense,5 deriving from the Article 51 of 
the United Nations Charter (hereinafter referred to as UN Charter) that allows States to respond 
forcefully to an armed attack.6 However, there are no cyber operations that have crossed the 
armed attack threshold yet, whereas cyber operations that fall below the threshold are utilized 
every day.7 Bearing in mind that no comprehensive treaty exists to specifically regulate 
international cyber operations, some non-binding rules have merged in State practice8 and 
States have accepted them in multilateral statements.9 The question arises of how international 
                                                 
1 M. N. Schmitt, et al. Tallinn Manual 2.0 On The International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations. Cambridge 
University Press 2017. T. H. Ilves. Foreword.  
2 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Lisbon 19.11.2010, para. 12.  
3 The employment of cyber capabilities to achieve objectives in or via cyberspace. See M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn 
Manual 2.0, op. cit., Glossary, p. 564.  
4 J. A. Shamsi, et al. Attribution in Cyberspace: Techniques and Legal Implications. – 9 Security and 
Communication Networks 2016 (15), p. 2888. 
5 See M. N. Schmitt. Peacetime Cyber Responses and Wartime Cyber Operations under International Law: An 
Analytical Vade Mecum. - 8 Harvard National Security Journal 2017; M. C. Waxman. Cyber-Attacks and the Use 
of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2 (4). - 36 Yale Journal of International Law 2011; M. P. Llorens. The 
Challenges of the Use of Force in Cyberspace. – 17 Anuaria Maxicano de Dercho Internacional 2017; D. R. 
Priyanka. “Use of Force” and “Armed Attack” Thresholds in Cyber Conflict: The Looming Definitional Gaps and 
the Growing Need for Formal U.N. Response. – 50 Texas International Law Journal 2015 (2). 
6 The Charter of the United Nations. San Francisco 26.06.1945, e.i.f. 24.10.1945, Art. 51. 
7 See Symantec Corporation. 24 Internet Security Threat Report 2019; K. Geers et al. World War C: Understanding 
Nation-State Motives Behind Today’s Advanced Cyber Attacks. - FireEye Inc. 2013. 
8 B. J. Egan. International Law and Stability in Cyberspace. - 35 Berkeley Journal of International Law 2017 (1), 
pp. 179-180.  
9 UN Doc. A/70/174. Report of Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security 2015, para. 28 (e); G7 Declaration on Responsible 
States Behavior in Cyberspace, Lucca 11.04.201. Accessible at: https:// www.mofa.go.jp/files/000246367.pdf. 
(01.03.2020). 
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law applies in cyberspace in order to identify the proper legal framework for responding to the 
malicious cyber operations that are less serious in character than armed attack.10  
 
Bearing in mind that harmful cyber operations tend to remain below the threshold of armed 
attack, victim-States can respond to malicious cyber operations and hold actors accountable by 
relying on countermeasures.11 Countermeasures are actions taken by a victim-State in response 
to a violation by another State to persuade the latter to comply with its international 
obligations.12 Although countermeasures are in principle legally available for usage by the 
victim-States, it is up to a debate whether countermeasures are used in practice when responding 
to malicious cyber operations. It should be also noted that countermeasures are the right of the 
victim-State, whereas availability of and conditions for collective countermeasures is 
controversial13; however, the coordinated use of responses by regional allies is emerging.14 
Furthermore, the harsh conditions associated with the application of countermeasures, such as 
the need to notify the other State and minimize collateral damage, can be seen as a stumbling 
stone for the use of countermeasures by victim-States.15 
 
Another difficult question concerning countermeasures in cyberspace and international law is 
attribution of a malicious cyber operation to an actor.16 The identification of actors is a tough 
challenge, as cyberspace has an open architecture, new protocols can be easily developed, and 
different spoofing techniques are used. Even if the origin of a malicious cyber operation is 
identified, the establishment of an actual attacker behind it, in most cases, as described in this 
thesis, is impossible, leading to the situation when capabilities of States to respond to the 
malicious cyber operations are limited.17  
 
                                                 
10 K. Kaska (ed). Trends in International Law for Cyberspace. - NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence May 2019, para. 1.  
11 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 20. 
12 International Law Commission. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. 
November 2011, Supplement no. 10 (A/56/10), Art. 22.  
13 President of Republic of Estonia Kersti Kaljulaid. President of the Republic at the opening of CyCon 2019, 
29.05.2019. Accessible at: https://www.president.ee/en/official-duties/speeches/15241-president-of-the-republic-
at-the-opening-of-cycon-2019/index.html (03.03.2020); See J. Kosseff. Collective Countermeasures in 
Cyberspace. - 10 Notre Dame Journal of international & Comparative Law 2020 (1), pp. 18-34. 
14 Council of the European Union. Council Conclusion on a Framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic Response to 
Malicious Cyber Activities (“Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox”) – adoption 9916/17. Brussels 07.06.2017.  
15 Articles on State Responsibility, op. cit., Arts. 49–54. 
16 See J. Carr. Responsible Attribution: A Prerequisite for Accountability. – The NATO Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence, Tallinn Paper no. 6. 2014.  
17 M. N. Schmitt. An Analytical Vade Mecum 2017, op. cit., p. 249. 
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If a harmful cyber operation is attributed to a State, one should ask whether it violates an 
international legal obligation. If the attribution and breach of an international legal obligation 
is identified, it is possible to establish possible countermeasures for victim-State to respond. 
While the purpose of the countermeasures is to cause the responsible State to discontinue the 
harmful cyber activities,18 the question remains as to whether the State may respond to harmful 
cyber operations that are not attributed to a State. In this case, there is the capacity of the State 
to respond to malicious cyber operations by referring to the obligation of due diligence. 
According to this principle, States have the obligation to ensure that cyber operations that may 
have serious implications for other States are not conducted from their territory.19  
 
For the purposes of this thesis the State to which the obligation is owed is known as the “injured 
State” or “victim-State” and the “responsible State” is a State breaching the international 
obligation. The State from where the harmful cyber operation is launched is known as the “host-
State”. The term “cyber operation” or “malicious cyber operation” or “harmful cyber operation” 
are used instead of “cyber attack” to avoid the confusion between cyber actions that may or 
may not qualify as an armed attack crossing a threshold. The term “operation” has no relation 
to the military nature in this thesis. The author refers to the term “International Group of 
Experts” as the Tallinn Manual 2 authors.  
 
The primary research problem discussed in this thesis is that due to the problem of attribution 
and the difficulties in the interpretation of scope and limits of international law in cyberspace, 
as well as due to the States’ strategic reasons, States do not openly resort to countermeasures 
and very seldom publicly discuss the allegations. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the challenges for a victim-State regarding the 
deployment of countermeasures in the context of malicious cyber operations conducted against 
it. The thesis discusses the conditions for the applicability of countermeasures that may justify 
a victim-State outside of an armed conflict (peacetime) to respond to harmful cyber operations 
that are not serious enough to resort to self-defense under the United Nations Charter.  
 
The primary research questions are: 
- Under which conditions can the victim-State use countermeasures in response to 
malicious cyber operations conducted by State/s and/or non-State actor/s? 
                                                 
18 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., pp. 125-130. 
19 M. N. Schmitt. An Analytical Vade Mecum 2017, op. cit., p. 249. 
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- How have victim-States responded in practice to significant malicious cyber operations? 
This question will be addressed in Chapter 2 in terms of five selected case studies. 
- What developments would support victim-States’ deployment of countermeasures in 
cyberspace?  
 
The hypothesis of the study is that States strategical considerations do not support the practical 
application of countermeasures legal regime governing cyberspace by the victim-States. 
 
The study consists of three parts. The first chapter explores how and when States may employ 
countermeasures in response to harmful cyber operations that do not qualify as armed attacks 
and does not address the issues of where the armed attack threshold lies. The concepts of 
attribution, breach of legal obligation, requirements and limitations in cyberspace under 
international law will be described. The first chapter also analyses the conditions for due 
diligence measures that should be taken by host-State, when victim-State requests the host-
State to take appropriate measures to end the harmful cyber operation. Additionally, the author 
will briefly examine the extent to which a plea of necessity may be invoked in order to justify 
the use of immediate defensive measures against harmful cyber operations that may have an 
effect on other States.  
 
The second chapter analyses five malicious cyber operations that were carried out between 
States. The case studies include cyber operation against the United States private sector 
companies such as Google (hereinafter referred to as the Operation Aurora); the cyber operation 
against Iran’s main fuel enrichment facility (hereinafter referred to as the Stuxnet case); the 
stealing of data and destruction of computers of Sony Pictures Entertainment (hereinafter 
referred to as the Sony Pictures Entertainment case); the stealing of data of the Office of 
Personnel Management (hereinafter referred to as the OPM case); and global cyber operation 
WannaCry. The scope of the second chapter is limited to malicious cyber operations that caused 
significant damage in the physical world or to governmental assets in cyber infrastructure, such 
as altering data in the attacked networks, or leaking of large amounts of governmental data. 
This chapter focuses on the responses and reactions of victim-States in order to examine 
whether they have referred to their rights under international law and on the alleged responsible 
State obligations under international law. The case studies’ selection criteria is more deeply 
explained in the beginning of the second chapter. 
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The third chapter analyses the outcomes derived from the second chapter to explore challenges 
in the usage of countermeasures by the victim-States and provide an analytical framework in 
order to answer the research questions of the thesis. The author will conclude whether due to 
the lack of precise international legal framework governing cyberspace or the limited State 
practice in implementing legitimate responses to malicious cyber operations, it is hard to 
precisely assess future impacts of legal framework in cyberspace concerning countermeasures. 
 
As the existing inadequacy of the States to use the legal framework to deal effectively with the 
malicious cyber operations below the armed attack threshold, the possible solutions examined 
in this thesis are significant for both the academic and research communities in understanding 
the countermeasures and open up opportunities for further research.  
 
The primary sources used in this thesis are the monographs Tallinn Manual 1.020 and Tallinn 
Manual 2.021. These monographs provide a series of draft rules that reflect possible 
interpretations of how international law is applied in cyberspace. Even though these rules are 
non-binding as such, these are the mainframe books that provide the opinions of a group of 
international experts who discuss the interpretation of international law in cyberspace. 
Furthermore, they are viewed as an academic work, which can be considered as a subsidiary 
source of the law.22 However, it is important to note that Tallinn Manuals do not officially 
represent any States’ position on international law, nor State’s domestic law. The thesis is also 
supported by numerous legal and newspaper articles, such as official statements by 
governmental agencies, press releases, analyses of cybersecurity companies, to show that the 
problem is real and timely, and that solutions are needed.  
 
Analytical legal method is mainly used in this thesis. Literature that is relevant to the research 
questions was collected by searching in the catalogues of scientific publications. The collected 
material was used to summarize the relevant aspects about the examined field in order to 
provide theoretical basis for further research. Comparative method is used in the second and 
third chapters to analyse the data provided in the second chapter in order to provide an analytical 
framework and answers to the research questions.  
 
                                                 
20 M. N. Schmitt, et al. Tallinn Manual On The International Law Applicable To Cyber Warfare Cambridge 
University Press 2013.  
21 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit. 
22 N. Jupillat. Armed Attacks in Cyberspace: The Unseen Threat to Peace and Security That Redefines the Law 
and State Responsibility. - 92 University of Detroit Mercy Law Review 2015 (2), pp. 115-116. 
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The case studies examined in Chapter 2 rely on publicly available materials such as official 
publications issued by governmental agencies, press releases, analyses of cybersecurity 
companies and press reports with the unofficial allegations. Due to the lack of public 
transparency in reporting on cyber operations and limited attribution cases, the author firstly 
conducted research to identify the harmful cyber operation that can meet the purpose and scope 
of the thesis. The author compared the lists of two depositories – the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies23 (hereinafter referred to as CSIS) and the US Council on Foreign 
Relations’ Cyber Operations Tracker (hereinafter referred to as CFR),24 and selected five case 
studies based on the criteria discussed in the beginning of Chapter 2. 
  
I am deeply thankful to my family for all the support they have offered me and for giving me 
an opportunity to continue my studies. I would like to express sincere gratitude to my supervisor 
Anna-Maria Osula who guided me throughout the process of writing the thesis. 
 
The keywords for this thesis include: international law, countermeasures, cyberspace, State 
responses and cyber operation. 
  
                                                 
23 Significant Cyber Incidents Since 2006. The Center for Strategic & International Studies. Accessible at: 
https://www.csis.org/programs/cybersecurity-and-governance/technology-policy-program/other-projects-
cybersecurity (15.02.2020). 
24 Cyber Operations Tracker. The United States Council on Foreign Relations. Accessible at: 
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations (15.02.2020). 
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I. COUNTERMEASURES  
 
1.1. Countermeasures defined and differentiated 
 
The countermeasures stand for the actions or omissions by one State (victim-State), directed to 
another State (responsible State) that would be otherwise unlawful, that are conducted by the 
former State in order to compel the latter to desist in its actions or omissions that are considered 
to be internationally wrongful.25 The employment of countermeasures in response to the 
international wrongful act by a State is permitted under the customary international law and the 
United Nations resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the Responsibility of States for 
International Wrongful Acts (hereinafter referred to as the Articles on State Responsibility) on 
28 January 2002.26 Notwithstanding, that the Articles on State Responsibility are not a treaty 
and therefore are not binding for the States, they are nowadays characterized as authoritative, 
reflecting the customary international law. The International Court of Justice (hereinafter 
referred to as ICJ) has confirmed the principle of State responsibility, and has recognized 
countermeasures on many occasions.27 This remedial measure comprising from the law of State 
responsibility can be cyber or non-cyber in nature that extends to the cyber space activities.28 
Customary international law of State responsibility extends to the cyberspace activities.29 
However it should be noted, that there is a disagreement among States on the interpretation of 
applicability of international law principles to cyber operations.30 
 
The countermeasures should be differentiated from retorsions, as countermeasures involve 
actions that would be otherwise unlawful, and retorsion acts are lawful, but unfriendly.31 The 
State actions that overcome the purpose, means, the scope of execution, legal rights and duties 
are strictly restricted when applying the countermeasures.32 A State has a right to take any 
measures necessary with regards to cyber infrastructure on its territory, unless the action would 
                                                 
25 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 20, note 1.  
26 Articles on State Responsibility, op. cit. 
27 See Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment, International Court of Justice 1949, p. 23.; 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment, 
ICJ 1896, para. 249; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovkia), Judgment, ICJ 1997, paras. 82-83.  
28 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 20, note 1. 
29 Tallinn Manual 2, Chapter 4, Section 1, note 4.  
30 A. Väljataga. Back to Square One? The Fifth UN GGE Fails to Submit a Conclusive Report at the UN General 
Assembly. -  The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 01.09.2017. Accessible at: 
https://ccdcoe.org/incyder-articles/back-to-square-one-the-fifth-un-gge-fails-to-submit-a-conclusive-report-at-
the-un-general-assembly/ (21.02.2020).  
31 Articles on State Responsibility, op. cit., Part 3, Chapter II, para. 3 of commentary; See T. Giegerich. Retorsion. 
- 8 Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law 2012. 
32 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 20, note 5; Rules 21-23.  
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be unlawful by a rule of international law.33 The object of a countermeasure must be a State, a 
non-State actor cannot be the target of an injured State, unless the harmful cyber operation is 
attributable to a State34, as discussed in the section 1.2.2.  
 
Countermeasures must be distinguished from the sanctions imposed by the United Nations 
Security Council under the Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, as they constitute to be 
lawful. As provided in Article 41 of the UN Charter, interruption of economic relations and 
other means of communication means may be lawfully implied to establish the existence of any 
threat to the peace, act of aggression or breach of the peace.35 When the Security Council makes 
a resolution authorizing the interference to the State’s cyber infrastructure, such activity would 
be lawful and thus would not be constituted as a countermeasure. Additionally, even if the 
targeted State’s sovereignty would be violated when applying the actions deriving from the UN 
Security Council resolution, the activity would still be lawful under international law and will 
not qualify as a countermeasure.36  
 
Further relevant distinction is the difference between the countermeasures and the plea of 
necessity. The measures deriving from the plea of necessity may be applied when the State 
confronts with the situation that poses grave and imminent peril to an essential interest to 
safeguard the interests of a State. Those wrongful acts and imposed measures may be cyber and 
non-cyber in nature.37 For instance, the plea of necessity in cyber context is relevant when the 
cyber operations threaten the operation of the critical infrastructure of a State.38  
 
The option of resorting to countermeasures provides a State with the right to respond to 
malicious cyber operations from another State that fall below the threshold for triggering a right 
to self-defense. Bearing in mind, that in order to use countermeasures the actor or the State from 
where a harmful cyber operation originates should be identified, whereas the plea of necessity 
is a means that may be used if attribution is not possible. Under Article 25 of the Articles on 
State Responsibility, necessity is a circumstance for precluding the wrongfulness of an act that 
would otherwise breach international law.39 It is a very rare case where a State can protect a 
                                                 
33 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 2, note 1. 
34 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 20, note 6-7. 
35 UN Charter, op. cit., Art 39 and 41. 
36 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 20, note 11. 
37 Articles on State Responsibility, op. cit., Art. 25(1)(a). See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project 1997, op. cit., para. 
51, 55; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
ICJ 2004, para. 140. 
38 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 26. 
39 Articles on State Responsibility, op. cit., Art 25. 
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substantial interest from a serious and imminent threat in only one way. As mentioned in the 
Tallinn Manual, the plea of necessity can be used when the exact nature and origin of a cyber 
operation is unclear. A State that has faced the situation that endangers its essential interests 
may temporarily shut down certain cyber infrastructures, even if it will affect the infrastructures 
of another State.40 The notion of the possible justification of counter-hacking in cases of 
necessity is also considered.41 
 
Even though a plea of necessity is a possible tool to respond to the harmful cyber operations 
when the attacker is not identified, this measure does have strict limitations. The essential 
interests of a victim-State must be at stake and a potential harm must be severe.42 The necessity 
cannot be invoked if the international obligation precludes the invocation of necessity or a State 
has contributed to this situation.43 Furthermore, State may not seriously undermine an essential 
interest of the State or the international community.44 In Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project case 
the ICJ illustrated that the necessity can be used only in exceptional circumstances and State 
cannot be the only judge to decide whether conditions have been met.45 According to the Article 
26 of the Articles on State Responsibility the necessity cannot preclude the wrongfulness of any 
act of a State which is not in accordance with the peremptory norms of international law.46 
Taking into consideration the mentioned above limitations, the plea of necessity is a last resort 
that could be applied, thus in practice is less evident to be invoked.  
  
                                                 
40 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 26, note 11. 
41 Ibid., note 11-12. 
42 Articles on State Responsibility, op. cit., Art 25 (1)(a). See M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 26, 
note 4. 
43 Articles on State Responsibility, op. cit., Art 25 (2). 
44 Ibid., Art 25 (1)(b). 
45 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project 1997, op. cit., paras. 51-52. 
46 Articles on State Responsibility, op. cit., Art 26.  
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1.2. Conditions for countermeasures 
 
Based on customary international law of State responsibility, countermeasures can be employed 
in response to an internationally wrongful act, having two components to be considered: breach 
of an international obligation owed to another State, and attribution of the wrongful act to a 
State.47  
 
1.2.1. Breach of international legal obligation 
 
There is an internationally wrongful act of a responsible State, when action or omission 
constitutes a breach of an international obligation to the injured State.48 This concept of 
internationally wrongful act is governed by international law and does not extend to the internal 
domestic law.49 Violation of the primary rules establishing international obligations entails 
State responsibility. For instance, the primary rule is the prohibition to use the force under 
Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter.50 The breach may consist of a violation of either customary 
international law or a State’s treaty obligations. For example, in case of an aircraft of one State 
that conducts harmful operations in the national airspace of another State is in breach with the 
customary law and it is in violation with a treaty.51  
 
There are certain circumstances that preclude the wrongfulness of a State’s cyber acts or 
omissions. Chapter V of the Articles on State responsibility gives a list of considerations 
precluding wrongfulness.52 For instance, a consent given by a State to a certain cyber operation 
or to certain assets of cyber infrastructure precludes the wrongfulness of the action, unless it 
exceeds the limits of the consent.53 Moreover, self-defense that has been authorized by the UN 
Security Council, force majeure, distress and necessity preclude the wrongfulness of an act or 
omission.54 Qualification of an act as a countermeasure, under the Article 22 on State 
Responsibility, precludes the wrongfulness of an act, meaning that a countermeasure is not 
constituted as an internationally wrongful act, thus countermeasures may not be taken in 
                                                 
47 Articles on State Responsibility, op. cit., Art. 2 (a)(b). 
48 Ibid., Art. 2 (b). 
49 Ibid., Art. 3.   
50 UN Charter, op. cit., Art. 2 (4).  
51 Convention on International Civil Aviation. Chicago 07.12.1944, e.i.f. 04.04.1947, Art. 1.; United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Montego Bay 10.12.1982, e.i.f. 16.11.1994, Arts. 17, 19, Art. 2(2).  
52 Articles on State Responsibility, op. cit., Chapter 5. 
53 Ibid., Art. 20. 
54 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 19. 
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response to legitimate countermeasures.55 It should be noted, that States practice and opinio 
juris interpret the international law, as well as consider which cyber operation constitutes a 
breach of international law. 
 
a) Sovereignty  
 
There is currently debate as to whether respect for the sovereignty of another State is the 
primary rule that imposes a legal obligation, or whether it is simply a legal principle from which 
primary rules, such as prohibitions on intervention and the use of force, derive.56 On the one 
hand, it is argued that there is a support in State practice and opinion juris for sovereignty as a 
rule of international law, the violation of which results in international legal responsibility.57 
On the other hand, some scholars present their approach that sovereignty is a principle.58 
However, neither of the disputed approaches, whether sovereignty is a rule or principle, is 
universally accepted and is faced with a relative inanity of public State practice.59 The author 
uses in this thesis the principle of sovereignty as a general principle from which a number of 
principles and rules of conventional and customary international law derive. 
 
The breach of an international legal obligation and specifically internationally wrongful act is 
connected to the principle of sovereignty that grants States with rights and obligations.60 
Sovereignty affords States to conduct activities on their territory without the interference by 
another States. The principle of sovereignty applies in cyberspace.61 Malicious cyber operations 
that inflict physical damage or injury launched against cyber infrastructure situated on another 
State’s territory amount to a breach of latter State’s sovereignty.62  
 
The territorial sovereignty means that a State has an exclusive right to exercise its powers and 
enforce jurisdiction over its territory, including the territorial sea, air space, and vessels and 
aircrafts registered under its flag.63 A State must refrain from exercising its authority on the 
                                                 
55 Articles on State Responsibility, op. cit., Art. 22. 
56 G. P. Corn, R. Taylor. Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber, op. cit.; M. N. Schmitt, L. Vihul. Sovereignty in 
Cyberspace: Lex Lata Vel Non?. – 111 American Journal of International Law 2017.  
57 See M. N. Schmitt, L. Vihul. Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace. - 95 Texas Law Review 2017 (7). 
58 G. P. Corn, R. Taylor. Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber. - 111 American Journal of International Law 2017. 
59 E. T. Jensen. The Tallinn Manual 2.0: Highlights and Insights. – 48 Georgetown Journal of International Law 
2017, pp. 735, 743. 
60 Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928); M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, 
op. cit., Rules 1-5, 35 and 37. 
61 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 1. 
62 Ibid., Rule 6 on sovereignty and Rule 1 and accompanying commentary. 
63 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, op. cit., Arts. 95-96. 
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territory of the other States.64 In regards to cyberspace, knowing that cyber infrastructure 
consists of physical tools, as well as cyberspace users are operating from the particular 
jurisdiction, States remain sovereign within this area and over cyber activities exercised 
therein.65 The principle of sovereignty grants States with the right to control not only the aspects 
of physical cyber tools, but also to promote and employ necessary legislation concerning the 
cyberspace and security issues connected to it.66 A State has a right to regulate cyber activities 
on its own territory, for example restrict specific content to be uploaded online or block access 
to violent content on social media. Such enforcement mechanisms should comply with the 
human rights obligations and rights.67 External sovereignty of a State entitling to independently 
formulate foreign policies and enter into the international arrangements regarding the 
cyberspace regimes.68 
 
According to the Tallinn Manual a computer network operation on cyber infrastructure of 
another State will constitute as a violation of sovereignty if the caused damage or injury will be 
at certain level.69 The question of where lies the line between unlawful cyber operations and 
those activities in cyberspace that do not constitute as harmful, raises. If a State injures another 
State or a group of States, the victim-State(s) may invoke the international responsibility of the 
responsible State and demand reparations, which can be made in the form of restitution, 
compensation or satisfaction.70  
 
Emplacement of malware into a cyber-system of another States, destruction of data and hacking 
seem to overpass the principle of sovereignty, whereas monitoring activities that constitute 
espionage are not. In regards to the peacetime espionage while using cyberspace, the mere fact 
that cyber operation was interpreted as an act of an espionage, it does not signify the violation 
of a States sovereignty. Rather, the underlying acts of espionage and operation must be 
examined.71  
 
                                                 
64 Island of Palmas (United States v. Netherlands), Award, Permanent Court of Arbitration 04.04.1928, p. 838. 
65 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 2 and 3. 
66 Ibid., Rule 2 (6). 
67 Ibid., Rules 35, 37. See Australian Human Rights Commission. Background paper: Human rights in Cyberspace, 
September 2013. Accessible at: 
www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/document/publication/human_rights_cyberspace.pdf (15.01.2020). 
68 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 3, note 2. 
69 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 1, note 6.  
70 Articles on State Responsibility, op. cit., Arts. 30,31,34-37,42,48 (1). 
71 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 32. 
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The mere collection of intelligence does not itself violate the international law, the exception is 
specifically protected data of individuals, facilities or documents under international law 
norms.72 However, it is up to a legal debate whether malicious cyber activities that only cause 
very limited damage or no damage, or are routed through the cyber infrastructure of the State 
will not constitute as a violation of international law.73 
 
A State may give a consent to another State to conduct cyber operation that would otherwise 
constitute as a violation of a State sovereignty. For example, if a State does not have the 
technical capability to end harmful activities that are conducted from its territory, therefore 
violating the due diligence obligation, a State in question may request an assistance of another 
State. In this manner, supporting State would not violate the sovereignty of another State.74 
 
b) Prohibition of intervention 
 
The International Court of Justice in Nicaragua judgment held that principle of sovereignty is 
closely linked with the principle of non-intervention.75 The principle of non-intervention 
derives from the principle of sovereign equality of States, prohibiting States to intervene 
directly or indirectly in internal and external matters of s State.76 Cyber operations that violate 
another State’s principle of non-intervention and are targeted to force State’s government in 
theirs internal and external affairs, do qualify as internationally wrongful activities.77 However, 
the prohibition of intervention is applied restrictively in cyberspace, as non-intervention 
principle generally requires more than just interference.78  
 
The principle of non-intervention, being a customary international law,79 requires the 
intervention to be coercive, involving matters on which every State, according to the principle 
of State sovereignty, can decide freely on its domestic affairs.80 Notwithstanding, the mere 
coercion does not suffice to qualify a breach of the prohibition of intervention. The coercive 
                                                 
72 K. Ziolkowski. Peacetime Cyber Espionage – New Tendencies in Public International Law. - Peacetime Regime 
for State Activities in Cyberspace. International Law, International Relations and Diplomacy. NATO Cooperative 
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 2013, pp. 431–442; Art. 27 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations on specific prohibition against espionage. Vienna 19.04.1961, e.i.f. 24.04.1964. 
73 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 1, 4. 
74 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 19. 
75 Nicaragua case, op. cit., Para. 212. 
76 Ibid., Para. 205. Corfu Channel case 1949, op. cit., at 35.  
77 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rules 43-45, Rule 66.  
78 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 66, note 3. 
79 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 66, note 1. UN GGE 2015 Report paras 25,28 (b). 
80 R. Jennings, A. Watts (ed.). Oppenheim’s International Law 9th ed. 2008, p. 428; P. Kunig. Prohibition of 
Intervention. Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 2008.  
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must influence the outcomes or conduct of a target State.81 For instance, suppling monetary 
funds to guerrilla forces in another country, as well as manipulation of public opinion on 
elections, can be amounted to an unlawful intervention.82 The distinction between coercive and 
non-coercive cyber operations has no clear conditions under international law. However, it is 
generally agreed, that a use of force by one State against another is always coercive, thus 
constitutes as unlawful intervention. Malicious cyber activities that fall under the armed attack 
threshold fail to qualify as unlawful interventions, as such operations tend to target private 
companies and do not affect matters that are dominantly reserved to a State.83 It is argued that 
State sponsored harmful cyber operation tend to remain more sophisticated and dangerous than 
cyber interferences committed by non-State actors.84  
 
c) Due diligence principle 
 
States are obliged under the international law and the law of State responsibility to maintain 
control over conducted activities on their territory.85 International Group of Experts in Tallinn 
Manual acknowledged that State must not knowingly allow cyber infrastructure to be used in 
ways that could unlawfully affect other States.86 In case of a harmful cyber operations that are 
launched by non-State actors, States are especially required to use their best possible efforts to 
comply with the obligation.87 
 
Countermeasures may not only be used by a victim-State in response to malicious cyber 
operations conducted by States, but also, as appropriate, in a situation where another State is in 
breach of its international due diligence obligations by knowingly allowing the use of its 
territory for cyber activities that contravene the rights of other States by non-State actors.88 
Although the cyber operation itself is not committed by State, it is responsible for its failure to 
stop them.  
                                                 
81 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 66, 19.  
82 Nicaragua case, op. cit., Paras. 205, 228.  
83 Nicaragua case, op. cit., Para. 202; United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/2625 (XXV). 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 24.10.1970; United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2131 
(XX) of 21.12.1965, Para. 2; M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., p. 45. 
84 B. Barrett. Facebook Now Warns Users of State-Sponsored Attacks. WIRED, 09.10.2015. Accessible at: 
http://www.wired.com/2015/10/facebook-now-warns-users-of-state-sponsored-attacks (04.03.2020). 
85 Corfu Channel case 1949, op. cit., at 22; See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United 
States of America v. Iran), ICJ 1980, paras. 67–68. 
86 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 6.  
87 J. Crawford. The International Law Commission’s Articles On State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and 
Commentaries. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press 2002, p. 140. 
88 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 6. 
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The due diligence principle derived from the principle of sovereignty89 of States and reflects 
the general principle of international law.90 It has been reaffirmed by the International Court of 
Justice in its Corfu Judgment that each State has an obligation not to use its territory knowingly 
for acts contrary to the rights of other States91 and Tehran case, that affirmed that States are 
bound to take appropriate measures in order to protect other States from non-State actors from 
the territory of responsible State.92 International treaties also support this principle, for example 
the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate Terrorism93 and the Declaration on the Strengthening 
of International Security, stipulating that States should refrain from organizing, assisting or 
participating in terrorist acts in territories of other States, or from acquiescing in or encouraging 
activities within their territories directed towards the commission of such acts.94 
 
The due diligence principle applies in cyber context unless State practice or opinio juris 
excludes it.95 This principles involves at least three parties: victim-State; responsible State 
under due diligence principle and third party as an actor launching cyber operation. It applies 
to private persons, States, non-State actors or groups, corporations, and encompasses any cyber 
infrastructure on the territory of the responsible State.96 State is in breach of its due diligence 
obligation if it (1) is aware of a malicious cyber operation conducted from its territory, the cyber 
operation (2) is contrary to the rights of another State, and (3) it does not take practical measures 
to prevent it.97 Each circumstance of this principle acts as a reasonable limitation on the 
potential responsibility of the State.  
 
Knowledge is the first decisive element of due diligence. The International Court of Justice in 
the Hostages case, brought Iran to justice by concluding that the Iranian authorities were fully 
aware of the urgent need for action and had the means at their disposal to perform their 
obligations, as well as completely failed to comply with these obligations.98 States cannot 
nonetheless have an absolute knowledge of all things happening on their territory. The 
International Court of Justice in Corfu case stated that it could not be inferred from the mere 
                                                 
89 Ibid., Rule 1.  
90 See Island of Palmas case, op. cit., p. 839. 
91 Corfu Channel case 1949, op. cit., Rep 4, 22. 
92 See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, op. cit. 
93Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60, 09.12.1994. 
94 Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security. UN General Assembly Resolution 2734 (XXV), 
16.12.19170. 
95 M. N. Schmitt. In Defence of Due Diligence in Cyberspace. – 125 Yale Law Journal Forum 2015 (68), p. 73. 
96 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 6, notes 7, 8. 
97 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 5, note 9.  
98 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 1980, op. cit., para. 68. 
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fact of a State exercising control over its territory, that that State necessarily knew or ought to 
have known what had been committed.99 The European Court of Human Rights, in Osman v. 
United Kingdom, also found that the unpredictability of human behaviour and the prompt 
choices to be made in terms of priorities and resources should be interpreted in such a way as 
not to impose a disproportionate burden on the government.100 
 
The problem arises when determining the standard of proof in order to show that a State knew 
that malicious cyber operation was conducted on its territory. Due to the fact that States exercise 
exclusive territorial control within their territory, the victim-State of a breach of international 
law obligation could be unable to provide direct evidence of the facts to demonstrate the 
existence of knowledge.101 The International Court of Justice, in its Corfu judgment, stated that 
a more liberal use of interference with facts and circumstantial evidence should be permitted, 
and that evidence may be based on facts, provided that they leave no room for reasonable 
doubt.102  
 
In that case the ICJ found that one of the indications of Albanian's knowledge of events was the 
fact that Albania, after the reported events affecting the United Kingdom, did not inquire into 
the event nor proceeded to judicial investigation. It is known that the Albanian Government did 
not notify the presence of mines in its waters when it should have known, while the Greek 
Government appointed a Commission to investigate the events, the Albanian Government did 
not take such a decision and did not initiate a judicial investigation into a case that was then 
under the authority of the sovereign of the territory.103 
 
The knowledge element can be satisfied with both actual and constructive knowledge.104 As it 
may be difficult to establish the actual knowledge of the State about a cyber operation 
conducted on its territory, a constructive knowledge standard ensures that a due diligence 
approach will not be completely redundant.105 Under this notion, a State should be aware of 
                                                 
99 Corfu Channel case 1949, op. cit., p. 18. 
100 Osman v. United Kingdom, Judgment, ECHR 28.10.1998, para. 116.  
101 Corfu Channel case 1949, op. cit., p. 18. 
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103 Corfu Channel case 1949, op. cit., pp. 19-20; M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 5, note 11. 
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everything that is conducted on its territory and could be detected in the course of normal 
events".106 For example, a State's knowledge would be more likely to be attributed to the 
common or easily detectable use of malware.107 Moreover, a State would be more likely to be 
aware of the use of its state's cyber infrastructure than of the use of private infrastructure on its 
territory.108  
 
While it is undeniable that the due diligence principle applies automatically in cases where 
States have actual knowledge of cyber actions, the question should be asked whether it should 
also be applied where States should have known of a particular situation. The Tallinn Manual 
provides an indecisive conclusion on this issue, stating that the International Group of Experts 
could not reach a consensus because this rule applies if the State concerned only had 
constructive "should have known" knowledge.109 
 
In Corfu case the International Court of Justice stated that a State in whose territory an act 
contrary to international law was committed may be asked to provide an explanation and cannot 
avoid such a request by merely replying that it is not aware of the circumstances of the act and 
its authors. A State may, up to a certain point, be obliged to provide information on its use of 
the media and investigations available to it.110 It is directly related to the duties related to the 
exclusive control exercised by States over their territory. The European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) or the Human Rights Committee has consistently adopted the idea of constructive 
knowledge as part of States positive human rights obligations.111 
 
The questions arise on what measures the State must take to be able to know whether there are 
illegal cyber acts hostile to third States conducted on their territory. The due diligence principle 
includes an obligation for States to monitor cyber activities on their territory, it implies not only 
obligation to respond, but also to prevent. The International Court of Justice held that due 
diligence implies that States should exercise administrative control applicable to all operators 
in its territory in order to protect the rights of the other party.112  
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According to the French White Paper on Defence and National Security, the importance of 
fighting against harmful cyber activities calls for developing intelligence activity and the 
corresponding technical expertise in cyberspace area. These measures should allow to identify 
the origin of attacks (attribution) and assess the offensive capabilities of potential adversaries. 
Identification and offensive action capabilities are essential to implementing a possible and 
appropriate response to malicious cyber attacks.113  
 
It should be recalled, nonetheless, that the duty of due diligence can only authorise acts 
compatible with international law. In the Genocide case the ICJ warned that each State may act 
only within the limits permitted by international law.114 The ECtHR also emphasized that the 
police must exercise their powers to combat and prevent crime in a way that fully respects due 
process and other safeguards that legally limit the scope of their activities to investigate crimes 
and bring offenders to justice.115 
 
It is clear that the "knew or ought to have known" criterion cannot legitimize violations of 
international human rights or other norms. The Resolution on the Right to Privacy in the Digital 
Age, adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 2013, is a good example of what States 
should respect in this area. This resolution invites States to respect and protect the right to 
privacy, including in the context of digital communication; to take measures to put an end to 
violations of those rights and to create the conditions to prevent such violations, including by 
ensuring that relevant national legislation complies with their obligations under international 
human rights law; as well as to review their procedures, practices and legislation regarding the 
surveillance of communications, their interception and the collection of personal data, including 
mass surveillance, interception and collection, with a view to upholding the right to privacy by 
ensuring the full and effective implementation of all their obligations under international human 
rights law.116 
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The third element, on enforceable measures, provides that States are obliged to intervene in a 
cyber operation only when they have the capacity to do so and only when appropriate in the 
circumstances. This element provides States with the greatest protection against the imposition 
of undefined liability.117 The feasibility of measures for a State will depend on the technical, 
intellectual and financial resources at its disposal.118 Thus, States will not violate international 
law for failing to prevent very complex cyber operations that they cannot control.119  
  
                                                 
117 M. N. Schmitt. In Defence of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, op. cit., pp. 74–75. 
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1.2.2. Attribution to a State 
 
The degree of direction and control by a State was set forth by the International Court of Justice 
on the Nicaragua case, when Court held that in order the United States to bear legal 
responsibility, it has to be proven that the States exercised effective control over military and 
paramilitary operations in which alleged violations occurred.120 The other ICJ judgment, 
Genocide case121, distinguished the standards set forth by Nicaragua case and Tadić case, when 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia with the relationship between 
States and non-State actors with respect to the armed conflict in Bosnia – Herzegovina.122 In 
Genocide judgment, the ICJ affirmed that the effective control is for the purpose of attribution 
in the law of State responsibility.123 Countermeasures may be used by the victim-State, when 
individual or a group conducting the cyber operation is under effective control and direction of 
a State.124 In Nicaragua case, the ICJ pointed out that the general control over forces with a high 
degree of dependence on them, is not an effective control.125  
 
Countermeasures may be applied only when internationally wrongful act is attributable to a 
State under the law of State responsibility.126 In case of a harmful cyber operation conducted 
under the armed attack threshold, it is supposed that countermeasures are a possible way to 
bring the cyber operation in question to a halt. However, the initiation of countermeasures may 
in practice be hindered, as it is very complicated to ascertain who is responsible for the harmful 
cyber operation, in other words to attribute the activity to an responsible actor.127 The lack of 
knowledge of the identity of a responsible actor makes it difficult for the victim-State to 
determine the proper countermeasures and the purpose of the activities is unsubstantiated.128 
The difficulties that are connected to the attribution raise the question of the appropriate 
standard of proof. For instance, what level of certainty must victim-State have to prove that 
harmful cyber operation originated form the responsible State, how much evidence is required 
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to initiate the countermeasures. Does the mere allegation of a possibility is enough, or there 
should be clear and convincing evidence?129  
 
The Tallinn Manual provides that if cyber operation originated from the governmental cyber 
infrastructure of a State, is not enough condition to attribute the activity to that State, it is simply 
an indication that the State is associated with the operation.130 For instance, if a non-State actor 
attempts to spoof the origin of malicious cyber operation, that is usually the case, then a State 
that is believed to be responsible for the harmful cyber operation should be given the 
opportunity to disprove that assumption. This is the case when botnets use so called “zombie” 
computers in different countries to mount distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. In 2013, 
North Korean cyber operation in order to shut down South Korean banking and media systems, 
allegedly employed more than thousand IP addresses in multiple countries.131 
 
Under Article 8 of the international rules on State responsibility and based on the International 
Court of Justice case law, there is an attribution to a State when the wrongful acts was 
committed by an individual or a group, and if the latter acted on the instructions of, or under 
the control or direction of a State.132 It should be noted, that there is no requirement that the 
activities should be governmental in character.  
 
The easiest case when activity is attributable to a State, is when military or intelligence agencies 
conduct the malicious operation.133 However, when individual or entity does not qualify as a 
State organ, but they are empowered by internal law to exercise specific element of a 
governmental agency, the actions committed by them would be also attributable to a State.134 
The example could be the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) that has a right to 
collect cyber data on behalf of governmental intelligence agencies.135 Under Article 6 on State 
responsibility, if a State organ is at the disposal of another State in order to exercise actions, the 
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conduct of the organ will be attributable to the latter State.136 In the case of operations of either 
State bodies or entities authorized to carry out elements of State power, the State is responsible 
for actions that go beyond the scope of the powers granted by the State, or that are contrary to 
the instructions. For instance, if a member of the CERT carries out illegal activities in violation 
of orders, the host-State is responsible for any breach of obligations to other States.137  
 
Companies that are owned by a State, such as information technology companies, cannot hold 
the State responsible for the wrongful conduct of the company solely due to the State 
ownership.138 Nevertheless, if the operation is conducted under the effective direction and 
control of a State, or the company bears governmental functions, the wrongful activities will be 
attributable to the State, thus the injured State can employ appropriate countermeasures against 
the responsible State.139  
 
The case of an activity conducted by individual or group of individuals that was under the 
direction or control of a State140 can be the situation when State enters into a contract with the 
individuals to implement the exploit and manages the process. If those individuals will conduct 
harmful cyber operations against the host-State, the responsible State would be directing State. 
However, in this case, their conduct is attributable to the State only if it directs or controls a 
particular operation that is an integral part of that operation.141  
 
The State's accidental relationship with cyber operations is not a basis for liability and the 
attribution. For example, cyber operations against Estonia and Georgia in 2007 and 2008, 
respectively, were not, at least on the basis of the evidence available, subject to Russian control 
to justify misappropriation and therefore countermeasures by these countries against Russia.142 
However, the countermeasures would have been justified under the due diligence principle. 
These situations are likely to grow in numbers, as the ability of individuals to conduct malicious 
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cyber operations against States is increasing and the difficulty to attribute those actions to a 
State is an impediment. 
 
Attribution based on direction and control does not extend to the situations when State organs 
or organs exercising governmental functions act ultra vires, exceeding the authorities granted 
by the State.143 If a State instructs a group not to attack another country's critical cyber 
infrastructure, and the group does so nevertheless, the group's actions will not serve as a basis 
for taking countermeasures against the host-State.  
 
If a State fails to take feasible measures to terminate malicious cyber operations taking place 
from its territory, the State is violating the due diligence obligation, and thus this omission 
constitutes an internationally wrongful act. When an injured State endeavors countermeasures, 
the requirement of proportionality, discussed below, must be taken into account, not solely the 
gravity and consequences will be considered, but rather the countermeasures will be generated 
to compel the responsible State to exercise control over cyber infrastructure on its territory.144  
 
Geography is not relevant to the issues of attribution, as State or non-State actors can conduct 
cyber operations from the territory of another country that is controlled by another State. The 
determining factor is the level of direction and control, not the location of the activities. For an 
example, a non-State actor on the territory of one State is under direction and control of another 
State, integrating the cyber infrastructure located in multiple States, and using the botnet to 
employ harmful cyber operation against the victim-State.  
 
On June 19, 2017, the Council of the European Union adopted the Draft Council Conclusions 
on a Framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic Response to Malicious Cyber Activities, also known 
as Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, that interestingly observed that not all measures of a diplomatic 
response require attribution to a State or a non-State actor.145 The toolbox reminded that 
attribution remains a sovereign political decision based on intelligence sources and must be 
established in accordance with international law on State responsibility.  
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On May 17, 2019, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Decision 2019/797146 
and Council Regulation (EU) 2019/796147 concerning restrictive measures against cyber 
operation that evolved from the conclusions of the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox. Base on the 
regulation in question, the measures as sanctions can be directed only against natural or legal 
persons different from a State. Therefore, States remain outside of the scope of the sanction 
regime. The European Union is on the opinion that attribution of a cyber operation to a State 
should remain sovereign political decision of every Member State and should be assessed case 
by case.  
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measures against cyber–attacks threatening the Union or its Member States. Brussels: 17.05.2019. 
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1.3. Countermeasures’ requirements and limitations 
 
Countermeasures may be conducted only by an injured State with the purpose to induce a 
responsible State to comply with its international obligations.148 Retaliation and retribution 
cannot be the purpose of countermeasures. Thus, when a State is willing to use 
countermeasures, the risk of escalation and genuine effort of resolving the dispute must be taken 
into account. It was agreed by the International Group of Experts that countermeasures in 
response to cyber operation cannot be taken or suspended, if the internationally wrongful 
operation has ceased or is proceed in a court or tribunal.149  
 
The use of collective countermeasures remains unresolved aspect of international law.150 
Tallinn Manual Rule 24 provides that only a victim-State may engage in countermeasures, 
however the accompanying commentary suggest disagreement on the collective 
countermeasures in cyberspace.151 Collective countermeasures are argued to allow States other 
than the victim-States to resort to countermeasures in response to malicious cyber operations.152 
However, such argumentation was not welcomed by the International Law Commission and 
States in the Sixth Committee, due to the danger of allowing a large group of State the intervene 
in other States internal affairs and possible negative effects on international peace and security 
under UN Charter.153  
 
On May 31, 2019, the president of Estonia, Kersti Kaljulaid, made a speech on annual Cyber 
Conference of NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, stressing the 
importance of collective countermeasures.154 Estonia was the first State to publicly address this 
issue. It can be seen that international legal community does not endorse the use of collective 
countermeasures, as there are strong grounds to criticize the possible abuse of such actions.155 
Nevertheless, if collective countermeasures could be enacted with significant limitations, such 
                                                 
148 Articles on State Responsibility, op. cit., Art. 49 (1); M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 21. 
149 Articles on State Responsibility, op. cit., Arts. 49 (2), 52 (2)(3). M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., 
Rule 21, note 14. 
150 M. N. Schmitt. Estonia Speaks Out on Key Rules for Cyberspace. Just Security 10.06.2019. Accessible at: 
https://www.justsecurity.org/64490/estonia-speaks-out-on-key-rules-for-cyberspace/ (18.02.2020). 
151 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 24.  
152 J. Crawford. Third Report on State Responsibility. Doc. A/CN.4/507 and Add. 1-4, 04.08.2000, paras. 105-
106.  
153 J. Crawford. Third Report on State Responsibility, op. cit., para. 405.; L-A. Sicilianos. Countermeasures in 
Response to Grave Violations of Obligations Owed to the International Community. - J. Crawford et al. (eds.), 
The Law of International Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010, pp. 1137-1148. 
154 President of Republic of Estonia Kersti Kaljulaid. President of the Republic at the opening of CyCon 2019, 
29.05.2019, op. cit. 
155 J. Kosseff. Collective Countermeasures in Cyberspace 2020, op. cit., 29-32. 
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as proportionality, the quantity of the potential persistent malicious cyber actors could be 
minimized.156  
 
The requirement that derives from the purpose of countermeasures is that a State that intends 
to apply countermeasures must notify the responsible State that it has decided to take 
countermeasures and offer to negotiate.157 In the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case, the Court also 
held that the injured State must call upon the responsible State to cease the malicious act or to 
make reparation for it.158 It should be noted that it is reasonable to submit both notices 
simultaneously. The mentioned conditions are particularly essential in the case of cyber 
operations, as the responsible attacker can be spoofed or the host-State may not be aware of the 
malicious cyber operations. In the situation of harmful cyber operations that may rapidly lead 
to severe consequences, the injured State may take urgent countermeasures if it is necessary to 
preserve its rights.159 
 
When State has the right to use countermeasures against the unlawful activities in cyberspace, 
the countermeasures must be proportionate and set a fair balance between the act of violation 
of international law and the measures taken by the injured State.160 As stated in Article 51 on 
State responsibility, a countermeasure should be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking 
into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the relevant rights.161 If a 
countermeasure is not proportionate to the injury, the measure amounts to reprisal or 
punishment, thus is violating the purpose of countermeasures. The question of what measure is 
considered to be proportionate raises.  
 
There are two approaches to measure the proportionality of a countermeasure.162 The first 
approach is to measure the proportionality of a countermeasure against the gravity of the 
violation that the injured State suffered from. This approach allows for de-escalation and is the 
most favorable among others.163 The second is that the measure must be commensurate with 
the injury suffered and take into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the 
                                                 
156 J. Kosseff. Collective Countermeasures in Cyberspace 2020, op. cit., pp. 29-32.  
157 Articles on State Responsibility, op. cit., Art 52 (1); M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 21, note 
10; See Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 between the United States of America and France. Reports of 
Arbitral Award 09.12.1978, paras. 85-87. 
158 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, op. cit., para. 84. 
159 Articles on State Responsibility, op. cit., Art 52 (2) 
160 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 23. 
161 Articles on State Responsibility, op. cit., Art 51. 
162 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 9, note 7. 
163 T. M. Franck. On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law. - 102 American Journal of 
International Law 2008 (4), p. 763. 
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rights involved164, that is supported by the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project.165 It is important to 
mention, that the approaches must be measured on a case by case basis taking into account all 
relevant elements.  
 
When the gravity of a countermeasure crosses the line of proportionality, the targeted State may 
consider the countermeasure as reprisal, therefore wrongfulness is not precluded. 
Countermeasure is disproportionate to the harm caused, when the mere intention of such 
intensity and scale is sufficient to persuade the responsible State to refrain from its 
internationally wrongful conduct. The countermeasures can be executed by employing other 
that cyber means, however in practice it is more evident, that victim-State will response to the 
harmful cyber operation through the cyber infrastructure. Notwithstanding, for example the US 
response to the Sony attacks exemplifies that a State may decide to respond by the non-cyber 
means, such as pressure to terminate bilateral agreements.166 
 
The proportionality of countermeasures and proportionality of jus ad bellum must be 
differentiated. Jus ad bellum proportionality is applicable in the situations when State has a 
right to defend itself against the armed attacks and prohibits the conduction of an attack when 
collateral damage will be excessive in relation to the prospective military advantage. 167 On the 
contrary, under proportionality of countermeasures in cyberspace, State measures the damage 
compared to the injury done.  
 
It is very challenging to determine the degree of injury that a countermeasure will likely cause. 
States should exercise due diligence when they use countermeasures, as the actions must be 
proportionate to the injury suffered and a possible countermeasure. Due to the various factors 
that arise with the severity of the suffered harm, time limits, the cyber infrastructure capabilities 
of the victim-State, each countermeasure in question must be determined case by case. 
 
                                                 
164 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 9, note 7. 
165 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, op. cit., para. 85. See N. D. White, A. Abass. Countermeasures and Sanctions. 
- M.D. Evans (ed.), International Law, New York: Oxford University Press 2010, pp. 539–540. 
166 D. Carr. How the Hacking at Sony over ‘The Interview’ Became a Horror Movie. - The New York Times, 
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reveals-hollywoods-failings-too.html (26.02.2020). See Update on Sony Investigation. FBI National Press Office. 
19.12.2014. Accessible at: www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/update-on-sony-investigation (26.02.2020). 
167 Nicaragua case, op. cit., paras. 176, 194; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
ICJ 08.07.1996, para. 4; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, ICJ 
06.11.2003, paras. 43, 73–74, 76.  
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For instance, when a State fails to exercise its due diligence obligation by taking appropriate 
measures to terminate the malicious cyber operation conducted from its territory, the injured 
State must be very cautious when exercising countermeasures under the State’s omission. 
Assuming the non-State actor that is not attributable to a State conduct harmful cyber operation 
on the territory of one State against the other State, causing damages throughout the country. 
The host-State of a non-State actor did not take enough measures to terminate the harmful 
operation, while it had the reasonable opportunity. The proportionality of countermeasures will 
be evaluated based on failure to take necessary and appropriate measures, not the injury that 
was caused by the non-State actor’s cyber operation.168 
 
Proportionality does not require a victim-State to violate the same obligation that the 
responsible State violated. The principle of reciprocity does not apply to the countermeasures 
in cyberspace. However, the injured State should bear in mind that the obligation of 
proportionality is likely not to be violated, if countermeasure used is correspondent.169 In 
addition, there is no obligation that a countermeasure should be numerical in kind with the 
internationally wrongful act. The victim-State can respond in number of cyber countermeasures 
that work together as a way to compel the responsible State to desist.  
 
Countermeasures may not affect fundamental human rights, violate a peremptory norms, or 
amount to reprisals.170 The Article 50(1) on State Responsibility stipulates obligations that 
cannot be breached.171 The fundamental obligations, such as the prohibition of genocide, 
slavery, crimes against humanity and torture, racial discrimination172, as well as human rights 
that cannot be derogated during the national emergency or armed conflicts173, put necessary 
limitations on the use of countermeasures. It is forbidden to violate diplomatic and consular 
inviolability.174 For instance, State cannot launch an attack as countermeasure against the 
embassy’s cyber system to demand the other State to terminate the internationally wrongful act.  
 
The limitations on countermeasures that may consist of actions that can rise to the level of an 
armed attack and amount to use of force are not discussed in this paper. Nevertheless, it is 
                                                 
168 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 23, notes 11-12. 
169 J. Crawford. The International Law Commission’s Articles On State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and 
Commentaries, op. cit., pp. 285–295.  
170 M. N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual 2.0, op. cit., Rule 22. 
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173 United Nations General Assembly. International Covetant on Civil and Political Rights. New York City 
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31 
 
important to mention, that the obligation to refrain from use of force is a principle limitation on 
an victim-State when using countermeasures.175 However, some Experts of the International 
Group were on the position, that this principle would mean the inability of an injured State to 
respond to the wrongful use of force that does not reach the armed attack level by using forcible 
cyber or non-cyber operation. This will limit the victim-State to use proportionate response and 
respond using countermeasures below the use of force.176 
 
An additional potential problem associated with the use of countermeasures in cyberspace 
relates to the fact that it may be difficult to limit the impact of a countermeasure by a State and 
not cause unintended harm to the third States. Due to the configuration of cyberspace, there is 
a risk that when trying to target one particular target, this may simply lead to harm to other 
targets. This does not mean, however, that countermeasures cannot inadvertently affect non-
participating third States.177 
 
Therefore, before taking countermeasures in cyberspace, the State must take all possible 
measures to avoid impacts on third parties and, if this is not possible, to keep the impact on 
third parties to a minimum. If a State realizes that, by resorting to certain countermeasures, they 
would spread uncontrolled and harm the systems of uninvolved third States, such 
countermeasures should be considered unlawful and the international responsibility of the 
initiating State should be initiated.178 
 
Countermeasures should aim at encouraging the State against which they are being taken to 
comply with its international obligations, measures taken after the commission of harmful cyber 
operation is terminated are incompatible with the principle of legitimate countermeasures. 
Exceptions may be made when a State faces a series of incidents rather than a single illegal 
cyber operation, and it becomes clear that the State is either responsible for these attacks or 
clearly refraining from fulfilling its obligations to cease harmful cyber activities.179 
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The relevant limitation is that only States may take countermeasures. Private entities, such as 
information technology companies, may be able to take effective countermeasures for their own 
protection, but they may not use them for this purpose, unless they do so at the direction of a 
State and in order to ensure compliance with an obligation that that State is obliged to take 
another State under international law.  
 
The limitations and requirements make it difficult for a State to take the necessary 
countermeasures against harmful cyber operation, the pressure on injured State limit the use of 
countermeasures. Malicious cyber operations are often unexpected and can cause significant 
damage to critical infrastructure of the State, it is therefore important to clearly define the 
conditions under which an injured State must assume responsibility and take the 
countermeasures necessary to preserve its rights. As long as above mentioned countermeasures 
conditions are fulfilled and the requirements and limitations are complied with, 
countermeasures are legitimate to be used.  
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II. THE CASE STUDIES 
 
2.1. Case selection criteria  
 
Every day hundreds cyber operations take place in cyberspace. The majority of these cyber 
operations do not fall under the interest of the present thesis, as the thesis focuses on malicious 
cyber operations carried out by States. The five case studies examined below involve malicious 
cyber operations that arguably originated from States or State-sponsored actors (i.e. State 
attribution can be established) and were directed against the victim-State/s official databases, 
infrastructure and governmental departments. For the purpose of this thesis, the case studies are 
limited to cyber operations that caused significant monetary losses, threatened critical 
infrastructure or national security, had potential to cause loss of life and damage to physical 
property or involved a large scale data-leaks exposing personal information of users. The pre-
existing international conflicts and political motives of the States will not be discussed in the 
case studies.  
 
The case studies examined below rely on publicly available material such as official publication 
issued by governmental agencies, press releases, analyses of cybersecurity companies and press 
reports with the unofficial allegations. Due to the lack of public transparency in reporting on 
cyber operations and limited attribution cases, the author firstly conducted research to identify 
the harmful cyber operation that can meet the purpose and scope of the thesis. The author 
compared the lists of two depositories, the CSIS180 and the CFR181, and selected five harmful 
cyber operation based on the following criteria:  
1) Cyber operations are alleged to have been initiated or conducted under the effective 
control of a State; 
2) Cyber operations have caused significant damage to physical world or to governmental 
assets, such as altering data in the attacked networks and / or leaking of large amount of 
governmental data; 
3) Cyber operations have been publicly discussed and commonly considered as major 
cyber operations; 
4) Cyber operations have not constituted a malicious cyber operation to gain solely 
financial profit; 
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5) Cyber operations may have generated the response of the victim-State, such as response 
acts or official statements. 
The selected cases must meet at least first four criteria out of the five criteria listed above. Three 
of the cases examined below relate to cyber operations against the United Stated, and were 
selected due to the availability of information about cyber operations against the United States 
and its relative openness of governmental officials to discuss cyber operations and responses. 
The three case studies in relation to the United States include: cyber operation against US 
private sector companies such as Google (Operation Aurora); the accessing and leaking of data 
of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM); and the accessing and leaking of data and 
destruction of computers of Sony Pictures Entertainment. Other case studies discussed below 
include the cyber operation against Iran’s main fuel enrichment facility and particularly 
destructive global cyber operation WannaCry. 
 
This chapter defines the time frame of events in each individual case, the damage suffered, the 
targets, the attribution of responsibility and the response of the affected State(s). The author 
focuses on the illegality of the cyber operations under discussion and countermeasures used by 
victim-States under international law governing cyberspace. However, it should be noted, that 
not a single State had taken responsibility for the harmful cyber operation as discussed below 
in the case studies. The author focuses on the responses and reactions of victim-States in order 
to examine whether States have referred to their rights under international law and on the 
alleged responsible State obligations under international law, such as for example due diligence. 
The analysis of the cases will be provided in Chapter 3.  
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2.2. Malicious cyber operations  
2.2.1. Operation Aurora case 
 
On January 12, 2010, Google announced in its official blog, that it has been subject to a 
sophisticated malicious cyber operation originating from China, which led to the theft of 
intellectual property.182 According to the blog, the purpose of the attack was to access the e-
mail accounts of Chinese human rights activists. However, only two Gmail accounts were 
accessed, and the e-mails contents were not exposed, except for information such as the date 
when account was created. Google also discovered that accounts of Gmail users in the United 
States, China, and Europe who are human rights advocates have been regularly accessed by 
third parties, but not specifically through the Google attack.183 The same day after Google’s 
announcement, Adobe announced that their corporate systems has also been hacked.184 The 
same cyber operation was conducted against 30 more companies, in the areas of Internet, 
technology, finance, media, and chemical, as Yahoo, Dow Chemical and Symantec.185  
 
This operation is known as “Operation Aurora” due to the fact that attackers utilized the Aurora 
Trojan horse program named directly from the unique lines of the malware code.186 The 
Operation Aurora was initiated with spear phishing, in other words by sending a tailored e-mail 
from a trusted sender to induce the targeted individual to open the e-email. These e-mails 
contained links to a malicious web site based out of Taiwan that when clicked, initiated a certain 
series of events. The attackers took advantage of Internet Explorer web browser vulnerability, 
often called as a “zero-day exploit”, that allowed to download a second piece of malware.187 
When the malware was installed, it set up a connection back out allowing the attacker to access 
the targeted systems.188 It should be noted, that identifying such weaknesses requires a highly 
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skillful endeavor, which can be assumed to be possessed by the larger organizations or 
governmental authorities.  
 
The Operation Aurora was a high-profile cyber operation against Google and the Symantec 
securities linked the attacks to the Chinese hacker group Hidden Lynx, indicating that the 
Operation Aurora was initiated with the full knowledge or under control of the Chinese 
government.189 Chinese IP addresses were detected as primary servers in the attacks, as well as 
programming codes were written using Chinese code and tools.190 The security expert Brian 
Krebs also linked the Operation Aurora to the Chinese government.191 On February 19, 2010 
the New York Times reporters published an article saying that experts believe that the attacks 
originated from two Chinese schools - Shanghai Jiaotong University and the Lanxiang 
Vocational School in the Shandong province.192 The Chinese authorities, along with the 
universities, have denied any wrongdoing. Lanxiang Vocational School officially stated that 
investigations did not find any trace the attacks originated from their school. Rong Lanxiang, 
the founder of the Lanxiang School made a public statement claiming that the New York Time 
report is merely a fabrication.193 
 
On January 21, 2010, the United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in her speech on 
Internet freedom called upon China to initiate a transparent investigation on the attack on 
Google.194 China Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu responded to the accusations by 
claiming that Chinese companies have also been hacked, adding that foreign companies need 
to adhere to laws and regulations of China and bear corresponding social responsibilities.195 
However, spokesman did not indicate that China will investigate the Google attacks. Another 
Foreign Ministry spokesman, Jiang Yu, responding to allegations that Chinese hackers were 
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responsible for the January 2010 Google attack, said Chinese law prohibits all forms of hacking 
and that the Internet is open in China.196 Chinese officials have also questioned the Report to 
Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage197, made by the Office of 
the National Counterintelligence Executive, arguing that the report is unprofessional and no 
comprehensive investigation was carried out. Finally, other officials refer the fact that most of 
the world's botnets are controlled from servers in the United States, hinting that Washington 
needed to clean up its own cybersecurity before accusing other countries of being responsible 
for the malicious cyber operations.198 
 
Google entered the Chinese market with www.google.cn in 2006 and surrendered under strict 
regime of China’s Internet censorship. However, after cyber operations in December 2009, 
Google reassessed its business in the country, which led to the relocation of Google servers for 
google.cn to Hong Kong in order to escape China’s Internet filtering policy.199 Cyber operations 
on Google that originated in China are argued to be part of a broader political strategy of China 
and pushed Google to withdraw from the Chinese market.200 The Operation Aurora was not the 
first nor last cyber operation on private and government actors, assumed to be initiated by 
China. On June 1, 2011, Google announced that hackers based in China, Jinan, had 
compromised the personal email accounts of hundreds of top United States officials, military 
personnel and journalists.201 The Operation Aurora is an example of how cyber operations can 
impact a tremendously large group of people, empowering the actors to conduct a subsequent 
cyber operation.   
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2.2.2. Stuxnet case 
 
The Iran’s main fuel enrichment facility Natanz and its uranium centrifuges began failing in the 
2009, but it took nearly a year before the Natanz inspectors learned about this.202 Around one 
thousand of Iran’s six thousand centrifuges were destroyed over the course of this year.203 In 
July 2010, a Belarus’ computer security company VirusBlockAda researched Iran’s computers 
troubleshoots and found out that the virus, later become known as the Stuxnet, used a “zero-
day exploit”.204 The vulnerability allowed the Stuxnet virus to spread from one computer to 
anther through USB stick205, that had a malware to infect Iran’s nuclear facilities and destroy 
centrifuges by manipulating rotor speed and pressure levels inside the centrifuges.206 The 
primary goal was to cause failures to the industrial facilities (equipment). If the Stuxnet was 
simply a gimmick, the adjustment of the frequencies would not be probably necessary. The 
Stuxnet virus was specifically designed to cause disruption slowly and gradually, and included 
a function that manipulated Iran’s sensors to pretend that the manipulated functions worked as 
normal, which made a quick detection less likely to happen.207 The Stuxnet virus was even 
called as the world’s first digital weapon208, causing physical damage to critical infrastructure.  
 
In November 2010, President Ahmadinejad confirmed the presence of malware that affected 
the Natanz centrifuges.209 The general secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, 
also admitted that the incident had occurred,210 however neither the President nor the general 
secretary have elaborated on the effects the Stuxnet virus inflicted.  
 
Security scientist Ralph Langer claimed that the Stuxnet required tremendous amount of 
intelligence about the Natanz systems, which limits the list of possible attackers who would 
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have the intelligence and resources to develop such advanced persistent cyber operation.211 The 
allegations that the Stuxnet could have been initiated by a joint USA and Israel effort have a 
simple explanation, considering the facts that Iran was most affected by the malware, the USA 
and Israel have a very strong military capabilities and Israel was threatened by Iran’s nuclear 
program.212 It is important to note, that neither the USA nor Israel has denied the accusations 
that of involvement in the Stuxnet case.  
 
The Russian, Chinese or German origin of the Stuxnet can be also considered. Russia being the 
only supplier of fuel for Iran, could have economically benefit from the Iran’s problem, as well 
as China could have prevented the Iran’s nuclear proliferation. Germany was also mentioned 
as a possible creator of the Stuxnet, due to the deep knowledge of systems built by Siemens, 
being a German company, that were used in the Natanz facility and contained one of five zero-
day exploits that allowed the worm access to the infected systems.213 The fact that the Stuxnet 
code had five zero-day exploits, which would have been worth millions to private hackers in 
terms of its resale value, again implied that there was serious power behind the attack, almost 
guaranteeing that such an attack came from a State with means to employ such cyber operation. 
Moreover, the information alone was nearly dispositive, since few States had the motivation 
and the means to target Iran’s nuclear centrifuges.214  
 
Finally, the analysis written one year before the Stuxnet coming to the light in July 2009 by 
Dan Williams, provided that director of the United States Cyber Consequences Unit, Scott 
Borg, said that Israel can be assumed to have advanced cyber capabilities with the possibility 
to control or crash uranium enrichment plants. Furthermore, as a way to access the computers, 
Scott Borg proposed the infected USB stick as a tool.215   
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2.2.3. Sony Pictures Entertainment case 
 
On November 24, 2014, attackers, calling themselves the “Guardians of Peace”, raided the 
computer network of Sony Pictures Entertainment - on every employee’s screen at Sony 
Pictures headquarters in California flashed a red skull.216 The attackers downloaded more than 
one hundred terabytes of Sony Pictures’ data, including unreleased movies, internal 
communications, scripts, and leaked thousands of confidential documents online while erasing 
them from the Sony Pictures’ systems.217 The attack affected more than 3000 computers and 
800 servers.218  
 
The attackers are known for threatening to release more documents of Sony Pictures, unless 
Sony Pictures cancels the release of The Interview, the Sony Pictures’ political-comedy film on 
North Korea leader Kim Jong Un.219 As a result of those threatening’s, the comedy film was 
not released220, as well as many theaters refused to screen the film.221 However, the 
cancellations were made after the attacks have caused tens of millions of dollars in damage, 
including the destruction of Sony Pictures’ information systems, damage to thousands of 
computers, loss of millions of dollars in revenue and the leakage of trade secrets.222 
 
On December 19, 2014, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter referred to as the FBI) 
declared that it has information to link the Sony Pictures’ attack code, infrastructure, and overall 
design to have been carried out by North Korea.223 On the same day, the United States, 
unprecedentedly, officially condemned the government of North Korea for the cyber operation 
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targeting Sony Pictures.224 The observers recognized that the United States’ response was a 
main example of a State officially accusing another of a malicious cyber operation.225 In a 
special year-end press release, President Obama said that the United States would respond 
proportionally in the manner of its choosing.226 Since then, international legal and technology 
experts have been actively discussing the attribution of the Sony attack whether to North Korea 
or not.227 Director James Comey announced with the high confidence that the attack came from 
North Korea,228 and the NSA Director Michael Rogers also said that he was confident that this 
was North Korea.229 Some experts however noted, that United States action could set a 
dangerous precedent.230 
 
The North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement, prior to the release of The 
Interview, declaring that North Korea would take a “decisive and merciless countermeasure” if 
Sony Pictures released the film.231 Thus, it may be assumed, that Sony Pictures officials were 
aware that North Korea could take measures to reach their political goals. The FBI 
representatives also noted similarities of Sony Pictures attack with the DarkSeoul attack, a 
previous malicious cyber operation launched by North Korea against South Korean banks. They 
also found evidence that the malware was created on computers with Korean language settings 
and the data revealed traces of an Internet attack that also pointed to North Korea.232  
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On December 24, 2014, the Internet in North Korea was shut down for around nine hours and 
the connection was interrupted for the next two days. This disruption of the Internet connection 
is supposed to be a covert reaction to a Sony Pictures Entertainment operation.233  
 
On January 2, 2015, the United States declared the imposition of new sanctions to North Korea 
as a response for destructive economical efforts on the United States company and the limitation 
of free expression of artists and other individuals.234 The sanctions were imposed on three 
entities and ten individuals who had connections with the North Korea government, which 
included the seizure of property held in the United States.235 There is no publicly available 
information on the evidence explaining why especially these ten individuals and three entities 
were sanctioned.   
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2.2.4. The United States Office of Personnel Management case 
 
The Office of Personnel Management is responsible United States government department for 
human resources housing a database of identifying information on personnel, including, but not 
limited to, the security clearances, data of the applicants along with the information on family 
members and friend.236 On June 4, 2015, the Office of Personnel Management revealed the 
cyber intrusion into its systems, that compromised around 4.2 million federal employees.237 
Later in June, the Office of Personnel Management announced that around twenty one million 
people was affected by a theft of confidential data as a separate cyber incident.238  
 
Due to the fact that stolen information was not only sensitive, but could potentially undercover 
the United States agents and put them at risk, the Office of Personnel Management data 
breaches were one of the most significant cases in 2015 in the United States.239 
Notwithstanding, in 2014, hackers had also targeted data of thousands of employees of the 
Office of Personnel Management, looking for the information on top-secret security 
clearances.240  
 
There is no exactly known how the access to the Office of Personnel Management network was 
gained, it is known that the attackers compromised a junction box with access to virtually the 
entire Office of Personnel Management network. The attackers were able to install a variant of 
PlugX malware, which provided a method of exporting data and securely accessing infected 
systems. There were many security and infrastructure holes, such as the inability to use 
encryption for sensitive data and the lack of two factor authentication. Once the attackers had 
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the extended credentials, they had all the keys to the system to capture the data.241 There were 
also reporting delays, as first signs of a breach appears to have occurred at least two-three year 
prior to the Office of Personnel Management announcement in June 2015. In June 2014, United 
States Investigation Services reported interfering to the Office of Personnel Management.242  
 
On June 24, 2015, James Clapper, director of National Intelligence, announced at an 
intelligence conference that China is a main suspect of the malicious cyber operations against 
the Office of Personnel Management of the United States. However, on the same conference, 
Michael Rogers, director of the National Security Agency, refused to discuss the possible 
attribution.243 It should be noted, that investigating these malicious cyber operations is difficult, 
not only because of the sensitive nature of the targets and the consequences, but also because 
the alleged attacker was over time believed to be the advanced permanent threat sponsored by 
China, with a high level of skills, resources and determination.244 Furthermore, president 
Obama considered imposing sanctions against actors who were engaged in that cyber 
operation.245  
 
China called the speculations of its role in the Office of Personnel Management breach 
irresponsible and unscientific.246 Moreover, during the annual session of the Unite States - 
China Strategic & Economic Dialogue, the officials from both countries did not discuss the 
official outcomes of the mentioned above breaches.247 However, Chinese authorities later 
arrested possible hackers who were allegedly connected to the breach of Office of Personnel 
Management’ systems. However, it could be seen as a way to lessen tensions with United 
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States.248 The United States were informed about the arrests, but no results on Chinese 
investigation were published.  
 
The director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, William Evanina, 
observed that the possibility that criminal individuals, rather than a State, has stolen data is 
highly unlikely, as the stolen data did not leak or any financial profit was not gained. William 
Evanina argued that government took the data from an intelligence perspective249, but still he 
did not publicly attributed responsibility to China. 
 
It is argued, that the United States Office of Personnel Management hack is linked to the 
Marriott Starwood hotel brand malicious cyber operation250 and the 2017 Equifax harmful cyber 
operation,251 that similarly did not result in an upload of personal data on the dark net. It is 
believed that all these operations are part of a Chinese operation to collect a huge database, with 
the intention of using big data collection methods to learn about the United States government 
officials and intelligence agencies. For example, data on the United Stated officials who are in 
financial trouble can be used by Chinese intelligence to identify potential targets and to recruit 
those officials as spies.252  
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2.2.5. WannaCry case 
 
On May 12, 2017 a ransomware malicious cyber operation, known as the WannaCry, affected 
more than 200,000 computers in at least 100 countries by encrypting computer files and 
demanding $300 in crypto currency from users in order to restore access. It was made possible 
because of the vulnerability in older versions of Microsoft Windows, that has not installed the 
updated versions.253 The companies such as Renault, FEDEX and Deutsche Bahn, were 
affected, as well as thousand computers of the Russian Interior Ministry254 and twenty-five 
percent of India’s Andhra Pradesh police department network.255 However, the biggest impact 
was on the United Kingdom’s National Health Service (hereinafter referred to as NHS) 
affecting at least 80 out if the 236 components of the NHS serving either geographic areas or 
performing specialized functions, and 603 primary care and other NHS organisations across the 
United Kingdom. Thousands of operations and appointments were cancelled, the NHS 
personnel could not access their documents and therefore were unable to update patient records, 
and thousands of pieces of medical equipment were locked.256 A Department of Health and 
Social Care reported that the cost to the NHS during the attack was approximately £19 million, 
due to the lost output and a further £0.5 million for additional IT support. The report also 
estimated a further £73 million input on further IT support required to recover data and restore 
systems.257 
 
The United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre believed that the Lazarus Group, which 
has ties to the North Korean government, launched the operation.258 On December 18, 2017, 
the Wall Street Journal editorial by Thomas P. Bossert, who was the assistant to the president 
for homeland security and counterterrorism, announced that the United States attributes the 
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WannaCry ransomware malicious cyber operation to North Korea.259 On December 19, 2017, 
the British government made public press release, arguing that it is likely that North Korean 
actors were behind the WannaCry operation, in particular the Lazarus Group.260 The Canada261, 
New Zealand262, Japan263 and Microsoft264 have also come to the same conclusion – North 
Korea was behind the WannaCry operation. North Korea denied any link with the WannaCry 
ransomware malicious cyber operation.265 The attribution of responsibility to North Korea by 
multiple States is clearly made, however, no act of response has been reported. The United 
Kingdom security minister called on States to develop a doctrine of deterrence to prevent future 
harmful cyber operation.266 Microsoft has also called on States to adopt new Digital Geneva 
Convention to have clear rules and limitations on such cyber operation whether they violate the 
international law or are in line with it.267 However, there is no publicly known official response 
by any State taken against North Korea. With regard to possible responses, an injured State may 
take countermeasures in response to another State’s malicious cyber operation aimed at ending 
it or at forcing the responsible State to make reparations. As the WannaCry operation has ended, 
countermeasures are now available only to compel North Korea to pay reparations, such as a 
compensation to the injured States. Like countermeasures, the plea of necessity is only available 
to end harmful cyber-operations, and thus it will no longer be available.   
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III. POSSIBLE USE OF COUNTERMEASURES BY VICTIM-STATE 
 
3.1. Attribution of responsibility to a State 
 
When a malicious cyber operation occurs, the victim-State is eager to establish the actor of an 
operation to respond against the responsible State. However, as it was discussed in the Chapter 
1, is it difficult to clearly attribute responsibility for an unlawful malicious cyber operation to a 
responsible State or non-State actor. Based on the law of State responsibility, States are only 
responsible for acts attributable to the State that are in breach of international obligation.268 The 
case studies show, that despite the increasingly common and destructive nature of State 
sponsored malicious cyber operations,269 it is difficult to locate the exact type of unlawfulness 
for these malicious cyber operations that fall below the armed attack threshold. Scholars have 
recognized the lack of clear application for low intensity malicious cyber operations and sought 
solutions270. Some have tried to broaden current international legal categories of impermissible 
conduct to cover these operations.271 Others argued that a new treaty or legal regime is needed 
before international law could prohibit low intensity harmful cyber operations.272 
 
Bearing in mind, that there is no established body of international law that defines the exact 
legal criteria and standards of evidence to determine whether cyber operation should be 
attributed to a State, individual or a group,273 States are expected to follow standard of 
reasonableness when attributing State responsibility, but they are not required to provide 
information on which they relied in determining attribution, thus absolute certainty is not 
required.274 There is also no internationally recognized way how victim-States can use legal 
attribution of cyber operations. Secret intelligence agencies may enable State responsibility to 
be assigned to a State with full or near-full confidence, but, since national security interests, 
such as protecting intelligence sources or maintaining the secrecy of technological capabilities, 
policymakers may refrain from publicly asserting attribution of State responsibility or 
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indicating its grounds.275 For example, the United States and the United Kingdom argue that 
international law does not require a full transparency as a precondition for attributing State 
responsibility.276 
 
The case studies examined in Chapter 2 show the difficulties in attributing State responsibility 
for harmful cyber operations. In three of five cases no official attribution was made. However, 
based on investigations conducted by cybersecurity companies, the nationality of actors was 
suggested; however, this does not endorse any attribution. In the Aurora Operation case and the 
OPM case, the attribution was assumed to Chinese hackers with the strong indication that 
operations were State sponsored, however, the assignment of responsibility to government was 
not officially made. In the Stuxnet case, the presence of malware was confirmed by the Iran’s 
president, but no elaboration on the attribution to any State or non-State actor was presented. It 
can be argued, that public attribution may have jeopardized the secrecy of intelligence sources 
and revealed their technological capabilities in relation to those harmful cyber operations. In 
the same vein, resorting to uncover technological capabilities may expose the technology to 
actors who could potentially imitate such destructive malwares and use them against their 
targets.  
 
In two case studies, the findings of an intelligent agencies appear to be sufficient for States to 
attribute responsibility to North Korea – in Sony Picture Entertainment case and WannaCry 
case. In Sony Picture Entertainment case the attribution was followed by public sanctions. It 
can be argued, that covert countermeasures were also made, such as the shutdown of the internet 
in North Korea.  
 
The WannaCry attribution can be distinguished from other cases examine in Chapter 2, due to 
the public and official attribution by a group of victim-States. The author is of the opinion, that 
recent collective attribution in WannaCry case shows that there could be a shift in international 
community approach to attribution of State responsibility. This may signify the beginning of 
cooperation between States to develop firstly non-binding norms governing cyberspace, that 
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can lead to the establishment of new international norms on evidence relating to cyberspace. It 
is possible, that some of these rules will be enshrined in customary international law in the 
future. 
 
As it is established, in order to lawfully respond with countermeasures, the internationally 
wrongful act should be attributable to a State under the law of State responsibility.277 When 
analysing the case studies, the author encountered the difficulty, that there is no required 
standard of proof under international law governing cyberspace and that the limits and extent 
to which information underlying attribution should be transparent are under question. In the 
Sony Pictures Entertainment case, the United States condemned North Korea for this malicious 
cyber operation, but did not provide any proof of such attribution.278 Tallinn Manual did not 
resolve this question also.  
 
There is legal uncertainty surrounding the attribution process, leading to the remaining of States 
silence in cyberspace. As a result of such imprecisions in international law in regards to 
cyberspace, the victim-States often remain ambiguous in relation to their activities and 
responses in cyberspace, which can be seen as an act of non-disclosure of their vulnerabilities 
or possible political decisions. Notwithstanding, such cautions approach of non-making public 
statements or even not acknowledging that a malicious cyber operation has ever been 
conducted, leads to the exacerbation of using unrecognized operational techniques by both 
States and non-State actors, such as, for example, proxy looser relationship with a State, when 
funding is received, but no specific instructions are provided.279 It may be concluded that this 
ambiguous approach by States not to resort to public and vigorous attribution of cyber 
operations implies a failure to attest to State responsibility. It should be noted, that this thesis 
relies on publicly open materials, meaning that we cannot fully understand the implications and 
possible responses of States to the harmful cyber operations conducted against them.  
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3.2.Breach of international legal obligation  
 
Malicious cyber operations that fall under armed attack threshold may violate other rules of 
international law, such as the sovereignty of a State if the consequences are significant 
enough.280 However, many scholars challenge the existence of a concept of prohibition of a 
violation of sovereignty that applies beyond the prohibition against the use of force and the rule 
of non-intervention.281 In particular, a question is raised as to whether international law 
prohibited cyber operations other than those that reached the scale and effect of the use of force 
or that involuntarily interfered with the inherent functions of other governments, thereby 
violating the rule of non-intervention.282  
 
The case studies examined in Chapter 2 do not clarify the legal framework of breach of 
international obligation under international law governing cyberspace. There were diplomatic 
and law enforcement reactions to the OPM case and relatively strong reaction to the Sony 
Pictures Entertainment case, which can be seen as a support for a broader application of the 
sovereignty rule. However, when the United States condemned North Korea for the Sony 
Pictures Entertainment operation, the secretary vaguely stated that North Korea violated 
international norms, but without explicitly referring to any violation of international law283, as 
well as President Obama called North Korea’s harmful cyber operation as an act of cyber 
vandalism.284 Thus, it can be concluded, that States remain silent not only in regard to the 
attribution, but also do not explicitly refer to any infringement of international law governing 
cyberspace. In WannaCry case, the victim-States also did not explicitly refer to the violation of 
sovereignty or any other specific rule derived from it. Thus, it is reaffirmed by the case studies 
that States recognize the existence of a challenges in international law governing cyberspace.  
 
The rule of non-intervention, which is derived from the sovereignty principle, is a part of 
customary international law under which a State should not intervene in the internal or external 
affairs of another State.285 According to the Tallinn Manual coercion is an constructive act 
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aimed at depriving another State of its freedom of choice, such as forcing that State to 
involuntarily refrain from any action or act in an involuntary way.286 The coercion is a 
prerequisite for the non-intervention rule.287 However, the non-intervention rule may be 
breached without the condition of coercion when the act captures essential governmental 
functions.288 The case studies examined above do not bring States closer as to whether States 
accept the non-intervention rule under international law as it is or tend to broaden the rule in 
question. It can be argued, that out of five case studies the Stuxnet operation can be qualified 
as a breach of non-intervention principle, because it aimed to prevent a State from taking a 
particular course of action. Assuming that operation was conducted by a State or States acting 
jointly, it remained below the threshold of an armed attack, because it caused neither human 
casualties nor significant long-term damage, nor the disruption of critical infrastructure vital to 
the functioning of the injured State. The operation may be also described as the use of force, 
but not in the sense of armed attack, as it reportedly caused material damage and was intrusive 
enough to consider it a use of force, although Iran underestimated its effect and did not claim 
that it was a use of force or an armed attack289, nor any other wrongful act under international 
law.  
 
In the OPM case, according to the United Stated officials, Michael Rogers and James Clapper, 
who proposed to take response actions against China, such as economic sanctions290, leads to 
the view that this cyber operation was a violation of international law, that may justify to use 
the response measures. On the other hand, others were on the opinion, that the United States 
should not take countermeasures, as it was actually an act of espionage.291 Notwithstanding, the 
United States did not use countermeasures or challenge China's claim that it had initiated 
criminal proceedings against private hackers. If the OPM cyber operation is considered as an 
act of espionage, the operation is not considered as unlawful act.292 It should be concluded that 
the United Stated response mostly appears to be only undertaking of necessary steps to improve 
cybersecurity capabilities.  
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The OPM case was included to the list of case studies because the operation has a severe 
disruptive effect on governmental activities and national security, as well as sensitive 
information of millions individuals was stolen. Such damage cannot be seen as a typical 
espionage operation, as some of the United States policymakers tend to amount this operation 
to the breach of international law obligations or even to an armed attack, justifying the response 
measures.293 It may be questioned, whether the response of the United States would have been 
different, it the data had been stolen entirely or could not be restored or even entirely deleted. 
 
The WannaCry operation did not appear to reach the level to constitute as a violation of Article 
2 (4) of the UN Charter, as malicious cyber operation affected mostly private companies and 
did not lead to the major disruption of the national economies. Therefore, the possible self-
defense response according to the Article 51 of the UN Charter could not be justified. The 
WannaCry attack did not fall under the prohibition on intervention into other States’ internal or 
external affairs, as the operation was not coercive aimed at depriving another States’ of their 
freedom of choice. However, this operation can be considered a violation of the sovereignty of 
certain affected State, for example for the United Kingdoms, as the biggest impact was on the 
United Kingdom’s National Health Service.  
 
Countermeasures cannot only be employed by the victim State in response to malicious cyber 
activities perpetrated by States, but also, depending on the circumstances, in the situation where 
another State breaches its due diligence international obligations by knowingly allowing its 
territory to be used for cyber-activities contrary to the rights of other States committed by 
private actors. The rule of due diligence imposes positive obligations on States to prevent its 
territory from being exploited to conduct the operations that can violate the rights of other States 
in a serious adverse manner.294 The case studies discussed in the thesis show that States do not 
rely on the due diligence principle when formulating their statements and demands against the 
alleged host-State from where the harmful cyber operation was conducted. In the Operation 
Aurora, Stuxnet and OPM case, the Iran and the United States respectively did not publicly 
invoke the due diligence against the host-States. In the Sony Pictures Entertainment case the 
due diligence could have been responded to, since the response was done with the North Korea's 
denial of direct participation in malicious cyber operation.  
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If we assume, that in WannaCry case North Korea’s failed to abide by its due diligence 
obligation, which obliges States to put an end to ongoing cyber operations from their territory 
that have serious negative implications for the rights of other States, it could be seen as a 
possible internationally wrongful act. Under the law of State responsibility, an internationally 
wrongful act requires not only the breach of one State's obligation towards another State, but 
also attribution of the primary act to the former. It could seem that a strong consensus has 
developed that the Lazarus Group conducted the WannaCry operation, however, it is difficult 
to establish the level of direction or control of Lazarus Group by North Korea, due to the limited 
public materials. The other reason for the inability to claim the State's responsibility for lack of 
due diligence is that it is required for the responsible State to have evidence linking the 
operation to its territory. 
 
The reason for a victim-State not to demand its international legal rights from the host-State, 
can be a fact, that victim-State will have to depart from its political strategic of silence and 
present evidence and specific understanding of the due diligence obligations in relation to the 
cyberspace activities. The lack of availability of information that links harmful cyber operations 
to the host-Sates makes the due diligence rule largely irrelevant in practice, as such cases would 
involve direct attribution of State responsibility. The case studies illustrate that rules that deal 
with due diligence are less relevant to State practice, whether or not States actually support the 
due diligence principle as it is constituted in international law, because States did not rely on 
the due diligence principle when formulating their statements and demands against the alleged 
host-State.  
 
It can be argued, that States remain passive in clarifying a legal regime to deal with harmful 
cyber operation that fall below the armed attack, as well as States are reluctant to adopt a strong 
ban on all cross-border malicious cyber operations, because such prohibition may restrict their 
own cross-border covert intelligence and even harmful cyber operations.295 If we leave 
malicious cyber operations that fall under armed attack threshold into the legally unclear 
category, it will lead to the inability of international law to prevent and repair the damages. If 
we recognize that the case studies discussed above go beyond mere espionage, as it is claimed 
for example in the OPM case, it is necessary to define principles of customary international law 
governing cyberspace.   
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3.3. Implications on countermeasures and possible developments 
 
The victim-State may use countermeasures, if the State from which territory the harmful cyber 
operation was implicated, was directly or indirectly involved in operation in question, for 
example through a violation of the due diligence principle. If a victim-State cannot show that 
cyber operation breached international law, then the only way for a victim-State to respond to 
a responsible State, is to use retorsion, as the act of retorsion do not violate the international 
law.296 Recourse to acts of retorsion may reflect the complexity of the choice between 
conflicting political imperatives of silence, on the one hand, and legal transparency, on the 
other. Despite its public nature, the use of retorsion, as opposed to countermeasures, does not 
depend on the adoption of a clear position on the content of international law and the question 
whether any right of a State has been violated. 
 
In regard to the case studies discussed in the Chapter 2, it is difficult to deduce whether States 
follow the rules of international law in connection with the application of countermeasures. 
There is only the Sony Pictures Entertainment case, where the potential resort to 
countermeasures was used, that allegedly led to the temporary disruption of internet in North 
Korea.297 However, there was no public statements on that case to examine the legal position 
of the United States, whereas the alleged countermeasure did not appear to violate sovereignty 
of a State or non-interventional rule. It appears that the operation directed against the nuclear 
industry in Iran was conducted in violation of international law rules, but the silence on the part 
of the involved States does not allow for an adequate analysis of the way in which States 
interpret relevant international law terms or how they apply them in cyberspace. 
 
Depending on how existing international law expands, States may lose the right to respond to 
harmful cyber operations that do not reach the armed attack level or, for example, be 
empowered to respond with a disproportionate number of counterattacks. However, such 
measures may not be sustainable, as miscalculations, human errors and different perceptions of 
damages may lead to responses that will result in even greater destruction and legal 
consequences than originally anticipated. Nonetheless, the alternative of leaving harmful cyber 
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operation below the armed attack threshold unaddressed (i.e. due to the political strategies) may 
also have a negative effect on the international legal order. 
 
It can be concluded, that States’ reluctance to publicly assert the countermeasures may indicate 
that States are not eager to clarify the legislation governing cyberspace or have no interest in 
notifying the alleged responsible State about the harmful cyber operation and minimizing the 
collateral damage. The case studies show that there is a gap in regulation of international cyber 
operations, which is connected with the silent approach of the States and their unwillingness to 
formulate their official political strategy publicly. Taking into account the case studies 
examined above, it is clear that States rely to a large extent on political consideration in applying 
responses to cyber operations. The findings of this thesis provides that the international law 
principles governing cyberspace and the application in practice are obscure, due to the problem 
of attribution and the difficulties in the limits of the breaches on international law in cyberspace, 
that lead to the unfortunate situation where States do not openly resort to countermeasures and 
even publicly discuss the allegations.  
 
The lack of cooperation between States has exacerbated the time when important decisions 
must be made regarding the responses in cyberspace. If States would not commit harmful cyber 
operations and host-States would help victim-States to track down their attackers, States could 
safely rely on passive protection knowing that attackers who violated the rules of international 
law would be tracked down and punished in accordance with the host-State's national criminal 
law. Unfortunately, reality seems to be different. In addition, even if the malicious cyber 
operation was attributed to a non-State actor/s and a victim-State wanted to respond, it is obliged 
not to interfere in the internal affairs of other States and to attempt to respond through the 
criminal laws of the host-State rather than risk to violate the sovereignty of another State. 
However, the due diligence can be also used to claim the responsibility of a host-State.  
 
The choice not to apply international law is even more evident when the victim-State did not 
recognize the cyber operation or refrained from trying to attribute the attack to other States, 
such it was the case with the Stuxnet operation, when Iran’s government did not publicly 
attribute the harmful operation to any State or non-State actor. Thereby States deliberately 
choose not to contribute to the interpretation of international law in terms of the malicious cyber 
operations. Notwithstanding, the recent interest shown by many States in the collective 
attribution of international responsibility for global malicious cyber operation WannaCry, 
reflects a different conscious decision to facilitate a coordinated open and public response that 
57 
 
could broaden the international law governing cyberspace. It could seem that we are on the 
stage of development of international law governing cyberspace, where national security 
considerations advocating the silence and ambiguity may gradually give way to the 
communicative and normative imperatives of collective action and the application of public 
diplomacy pressure, which would affect the policies of the States worldwide.298  
 
Based on the case studies examined in the second chapter, it can be reaffirmed, that reactions 
of the victim-States to malicious cyber operations directed against them indicate that existing 
international law in the eyes of the States are subject to strict enforcement measures. Such an 
approach may arise from doubts as to the advisability of applying international law in response 
to harmful cyber operation, bearing in mind the problems of attribution mentioned above.  
 
The possible development that could be adopted by States, is to establish international body for 
the attribution of responsibility to a State or non-State actors,299 that would provide a legitimate 
basis for the usage of countermeasures by the victim-State or collective sanctions against the 
responsible State. The proposals by the Atlantic Council in 2012 and Microsoft Corporation in 
2016300, indicate the importance of strong multilateral participation of States, as well as strong 
technical competence. However, such solution could only emerge if States under their free will 
decide to develop such institution. The limited response of victim-States may also reflect their 
interest in maintaining legal ambiguity to participate in offensive cyber operations on their part. 
If such an institution had succeeded in conferring legitimacy, it could have partially resolved 
many of the difficulties associated with the attribution problem that arise today from the lack 
of an internationally recognized rules on how international law should be applied in cyberspace. 
 
The case studies illustrate that victim-States focus their responses on detecting and further 
deterring cybersecurity breaches in order to minimize negative impacts, rather than publicly 
provide any information that can potentially be used against them. It could be seen, that victim-
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States do not want to draw attention to the national cybersecurity misleads, that further can put 
pressure on States to respond. Furthermore, none of the States invoked its rights under specific 
treaties.  
 
The main conclusions are that there seems to be limited States’ support for the interpretation of 
international law rules in State' practice and it is difficult to establish whether States accept 
those rules and wish to clarify the application of international law regulating harmful cyber 
operations. This thesis also shows that States involved in malicious cyber operations discussed 
in the Chapter 2 seem to have little interest in promoting legal certainty in regulating 
cyberspace.  
 
Furthermore, the case studies indicate that States tend not to rely publicly and directly on 
specific rules of international law in connection with harmful cyber operations conducted 
against them and instead prefer a policy of silence and ambiguity. Some of the victim-States do 
not recognize that they have been attacked, while most of the victim-States are not prone to 
attribute responsibility to other States and impose responsibility, as well as most victim-States 
do not explicitly refer to the right to take countermeasures under international law. Only in 
Sony Pictures Entertainment case the victim-State openly resorted to response action in regards 
to the malicious cyber operation.  
 
It should be noted that the challenges identified in the thesis cannot be rectified immediately 
and possible developments, as the recent collective attribution claims in WannaCry case, may 
represent a shift in the attitude of States towards the role of international law in cyberspace. 
This should signify an important step in ensuring stability and order in cyberspace. This shift 
can ensure greater accountability by strengthening inter-State cooperation in attributing 
responsibility for malicious cyber operations that fall under the armed attack threshold and 
develop a coordinated response to harmful cyber operations and impose countermeasures to the 
responsible States. The growing interest in the use of international law for coordinating and 
legitimizing inter-State responses to malicious cyber operation may encourage States to develop 
and adopt international legal instrument governing cyberspace. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to analyse the challenges for a victim-State regarding the 
deployment of countermeasures in the context of malicious cyber operations conducted against 
it. The thesis discussed the conditions for the applicability of countermeasures that may justify 
a victim-State outside of an armed conflict to respond to harmful cyber operations that are not 
serious enough to resort to self-defense under the United Nations Charter. The main difficulty 
was that due to the problem of attribution and the difficulties in the interpretation of scope and 
limits of international law in cyberspace, as well as due to the States’ strategic reasons, States 
do not openly resort to countermeasures and very seldom publicly discuss the allegations. 
 
There were three parts in this thesis that helped to find a solution to the indicated problem. The 
first one analyzed when and how victim-States may employ countermeasures in response to 
malicious cyber operations. The study went on to analyse the concepts of attribution, breach of 
legal obligation and limitations in cyberspace under international law. The second chapter 
analysed five malicious cyber operation, such as the Operation Aurora, the Stuxnet case, the 
Sony Pictures Entertainment case, the OPM case and WannaCry operation. This chapter 
examined whether victim-States have referred to their rights under international law when they 
encountered malicious cyber operations. In the Chapter 3, the author explored challenges in the 
usage of countermeasures based on five case studies and provided possible developments and 
answers to the research questions.  
 
The hypothesis of the study was that States strategical considerations do not support the 
practical application of countermeasures legal regime governing cyberspace by the victim-
States. 
 
The hypothesis of this thesis was confirmed – States tend not to rely publicly and directly on 
specific rules of international law in connection with harmful cyber operations conducted 
against them and instead prefer a policy of silence and ambiguity. The case studies examined 
show that political and strategical considerations of States do not support the practical 
application countermeasures by the injured States.  
 
The primary research questions were: 
- Under which conditions can the victim-State use countermeasures in response to 
malicious cyber operations conducted by State/s and/or non-State actor/s? 
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- How have victim-States responded in practice to the significant malicious cyber 
operations?  
- What developments would support victim-States’ deployment of countermeasures in 
cyberspace?  
 
A victim-State targeted by harmful cyber operation that fall below the threshold for triggering 
a right to self-defence may legitimately attempt to bring the attack to a halt by resorting to 
proportionate countermeasures and, in some circumstances at least, plea of necessity. However, 
a number of important uncertainties remain regarding the specific application of the law. 
Countermeasures are subject to important restrictions. Most significant among these is the 
limitation of countermeasures to internationally wrongful acts attributable to States. If a victim-
State cannot show that cyber operation breached international law and attribute the operation 
to the responsible State, then the only way for a victim-State to respond to a responsible State 
is to use retorsion, as the act of retorsion do not violate the international law. Regarding the 
case studies discussed, it is difficult to deduce whether States follow the rules of international 
law in connection with the application of countermeasures. 
 
In the case of cyber operations launched by non-State actors, the international wrongfulness of 
a victim-State’s response will not be precluded unless a separate breach by the State to which 
the victim-State’s obligations are owed can be identified, such as due diligence. The case studies 
examined in this thesis indicate that there is legal uncertainty surrounding the attribution 
process and legal framework of breach of international obligation under international law 
governing cyberspace, leading to the remaining of States silence in cyberspace. As a result of 
such inaccuracies in international law governing cyberspace, victim-States often remain 
ambiguous about their activities and responses in cyberspace, which may be seen as an act of 
non-disclosure of their vulnerabilities or possible policy decisions. The attribution of malicious 
cyber operations to States creates unique legal challenges that have not yet been fully addressed 
under international law. As a result, in the absence of an effective State responsibility regime, 
a strong commitment to existing international law and the rule of law may weaken. 
 
The limitation to collective countermeasures restricts the potential effectiveness of 
countermeasures in question, as in many cases, the victim-State may be unable to respond, but 
has friendly relations with other States that possess the means, and that would be willing to 
come to the assistance. Other limitations, such as proportionality and purpose, further temper 
the scope of the resorting to countermeasures. Proportionality will be measured against the 
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violation of international obligation, not the severity of the State or non-State actor’s malicious 
cyber operations.  
 
This thesis provided an account of countermeasures and its implications for State responsibility 
in cyberspace. It is recognized that States should not allow malicious cyber operations to be 
conducted on their territories that will cause serious negative consequences for other States. 
The general applicability of due diligence to cyberspace is not disputed. However, the case 
studies discussed in the thesis show that States do not rely on the due diligence principle when 
formulating their statements and demands against the alleged host-State from where the harmful 
cyber operation was conducted. 
 
While examining the second research question of this thesis and taking into account the case 
studies analysed above, it became clear that there seems to be limited support for the 
interpretation of international law rules in States' practice and that States rely to a large extent 
on political consideration in applying responses to cyber operations. The five case studies do 
not show that States generally accept or rely on the normative categories of international law 
governing cyberspace to draw meaningful legal distinctions in their reactions to malicious cyber 
operations.  
 
The findings of this thesis demonstrate that the international law principles governing 
cyberspace and the application in practice are obscure due to the problem of attribution and the 
difficulties in the limits of the breaches on international law in cyberspace that lead to the 
unfortunate situation where States do not openly resort to countermeasures or even publicly 
discuss the allegations. States’ reluctance to publicly assert the countermeasures may indicate 
that States are not eager to clarify the legislation governing cyberspace or have no interest in 
notifying the alleged responsible State about the harmful cyber operation and minimizing 
collateral damage. The case studies illustrate that victim-States focus their responses on 
detecting and further deterring cybersecurity breaches in order to minimize negative impacts, 
rather than publicly provide any information that can potentially be used against them. 
 
The author argued that the establishment of an international body for the attribution of 
responsibility to a State or non-State actor in cyberspace would be an effective mean of ensuring 
the proper regulation of cyberspace within the framework of international law on State 
responsibility. It was argued that such development would provide a legitimate basis for the 
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usage of countermeasures by the victim-State or collective sanctions against the responsible 
State. 
 
The official reactions and public statements like those following the Sony Pictures 
Entertainment case enhance transparency and enable public and scholarly debate on the right 
application of the international law in cyberspace. However, all of the issues are unlikely to be 
resolved in the near future. The debate on how international law should regulate malicious cyber 
operation that fall under the threshold of an armed attack is also a debate on how States perceive 
the international law should regulate such operations, and on such issues it will be difficult to 
reach the agreement. 
 
This, however, does not mean that no international law regulation of malicious cyber operations 
is possible or desirable. For example, recent developments following the collective attribution 
claims in WannaCry case and the speech of Estonian President at CyCon, relating to the need 
of development of collective countermeasures, may render the international law rules more 
relevant than before and may generate greater interest in the establishment of an international 
attribution body to improve collective enforcement capabilities. This shift can ensure greater 
accountability by strengthening inter-State cooperation in attributing responsibility for 
malicious cyber operations that fall under the armed attack threshold and develop a coordinated 
response to harmful cyber operations and impose countermeasures to the responsible States.   
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
CERT – Computer emergency response team 
CFR – The Council on Foreign Relations 
CSIS – Center for Strategic and International Studies 
DDoS – Distributed denial of service 
ECtHR - The European Court of Human Rights 
EU – European Union 
ICAO – International Civil Aviation Organization 
ICJ – International Court of Justice 
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
UN – United Nations 
UN Charter – United Nations Charter 
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